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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PRO­
CEDURE 6(e): CRIMINAL OR CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
GRAND JURY SECRECY? 
INTRODUCTION 
The grand jury has evolved from its English origins as a vehicle to 
serve the will of the king! to its function today as an investigatory 
body that both assists the prosecutor in bringing criminal accusations 
and protects the innocent against unjustified prosecutions.2 Similarly, 
the secrecy required of grand juries has developed to serve the compet­
ing interests of the government's criminal investigations and of the in­
dividual's liberty.3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides 
for secrecy in grand jury investigations.4 
1. Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REv. 590, 590 
(1961). 
2. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972) (A grand jury serves the 
"dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been 
committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. "); M. 
FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 19 (1977) 
("[A]ll grand juries have a common function: to determine if there is sufficient evidence to 
warrant putting the subject of an investigation on trial, where the question of guilt or inno­
cence can be determined."); Stem, Revealing Misconduct by Public Officials Through Grand 
Jury Reports, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 73, 83 (1987) ("It is generally agreed, however, that in its 
development the grand jury had sharpened its sword to a fine point long before it acquired 
its shield."). 
3. See United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he grand jury 
is as a matter of fact an investigative arm of the prosecutor's office, as a matter of theory it 
is a protection for the liberty of the subject ...."). 
4. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides in relevant part: 
(e) RECORDING AND DISCLOSURE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
(1) Recording 0/Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury 
is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic 
recording device. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or 
any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The 
recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in 
the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise or­
dered by the court in a particular case. 
(2) General Rule o/Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, 
an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an 
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under 
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before 
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of 
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A 
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court. 
245 
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The grand jury's dual functions of "sword and shield"5 are em­
bodied in the text and legislative history of Rule 6(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 This same dual principle is found in 
the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e), where Congress amended the rule 
"to facilitate an increasing need, on the part of Government attorneys 
to make use of outside expertise in complex litigation."7 As a conse­
quence of the 1977 amendments, the rule enhanced the "sword" as­
pect of secrecy by loosening the restrictions on disclosure of grand jury 
materials in order to assist the government in its investigatory func­
tion.8 However, to curtail or discourage abuse of the grand jury, the 
"shield" function, the rule continues to prohibit disclosure9 of "mat­
ters occurring before the grand jury" except under particular circum­
stances of governmental need. 10 Rule 6(e) requires an ex parte hearing 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). See infra note 10 for the text of Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). 
5. In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury Impaneled January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 
662, 671 (D. Md. 1970) ("The Grand Jury is both a sword and a shield."). See generally 
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1985), stating that the grand jury: 
is likened to a shield in its operation as a screening agency interposed between the 
government and the individual. ... [T]he grand jury ... "protect[s] the individual 
Citizen against oppressive and unfounded government prosecution." The grand 
jury is likened to a sword in its performance as an investigative agency .... Utiliz­
ing its investigative authority, the grand jury uncovers evidence not previously 
available to the prosecution, and thereby provides the sword that enables the gov­
ernment to secure convictions that might otherwise not be obtained. 
Id. at 346. 
6. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1946 enact­
ment of Rule 6. 
7. H.R. REP. No. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; 
S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1977 
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 529; H.R. Doc. No. 464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 
(1976) [hereinafter HOUSE DOCUMENT]. 
8. See infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative 
history of the 1977 amendments. 
9. In this Note, the term "disclosure" is used to refer to both permissible and imper­
missible revelations of "matters occurring before the grand jury" as defined by Rule 6(e). 
10. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides in relevant part: 
(3) Exceptions. 
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring 
before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, 
may be made to-­
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such 
attorney's duty; and 
(ii) such government personnel ... as are deemed necessary by an 
attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the per­
formance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. 
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) 
of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other 
than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attor­
ney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall 
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to obtain a court order for disclosure not otherwise permitted by the 
rule. 11 An additional, deliberate safeguard that protects the targets of 
grand jury investigations is the final sentence of Rule 6(e)(2), added in 
1977, which provides a penalty of contempt for a knowing violation of 
the rule. 12 
Prior to the 1977 amendments, contempt was used throughout 
the circuits as a sanction for violations of grand jury secrecy under the 
inherent supervisory power of the courts. Since 1977, the express con­
tempt provision in the rule has been cited as authority for holding 
individuals in contempt of court. Two recent cases have questioned 
whether contempt, as contemplated by the 1977 amendments, is civil 
and/or criminal. 
In the case of Blalock v. United States,13 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recognized a private cause of ac­
tion seeking injunctive relief for alleged violations of Rule 6(e). 
Although bound by precedent,14 two of the judges in a special concur-
promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury 
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom 
such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the attorney has advised 
such persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule. 
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring 
before the grand jury may also be made­
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with 
a judicial proceeding; 
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a 
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of 
matters occurring before the grand jury; 
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the dis­
closure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as 
the court may direct. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
11. [d. at 6(e)(C)(i)(ii); SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in 1977 u.S. 
CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 532 ("It is contemplated that the judicial hearing in 
connection with an application for a court order by the government under subparagraph 
(3)(C)(i) should be ex parte so as to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, grand jury 
secrecy. "). 
12. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides that "[a] knowing violation 
of Rule 6(e) may be punished as a contempt of court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
13. 844 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988). 
14. [d. at 1550 n.6 ("In Bonner v. City ofPrichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (l1th Cir. 
1981) (en bane), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth 
Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981."); see Lance v. United States Dep't of Jus­
tice, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980). The Lance court was the first court to recognize a 
private cause of action allowing a target to invoke the civil contempt power of the court, 
while not discussing whether a target has standing to seek such relief or whether the relief 
sought was criminal or civil. S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE 
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rence lS disagreed with the reasoning that led the majority to recognize 
the right of an individual to invoke the civil contempt powers of the 
court. 16 The concurring judges argued that the text and legislative 
history of Rule 6(e) indicated that violations of grand jury secrecy are 
enforced solely with criminal contempt sanctions. 
In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum­
bia Circuit, the majority, in Barry v. United States,17 relying on the 
holding in Blalock as persuasive precedent, recognized a private cause 
of action invoking the contempt power of the court. The dissent in 
Barry agreed with the Blalock special concurrence that Rule 6(e)(2) is 
solely a criminal contempt provision. IS The dissent in Barry disagreed 
with the majority for its failure to consider a criminal contempt sanc­
tion in light of the fact that the court, in this instance, was not bound 
by precedent as were the judges in Blalock. 19 
The majority opinion in both cases recognized the private cause 
of action for injunctive relief invoking the civil contempt power of the 
court for violations of Rule 6(e).· Although recognizing the remedy of 
civil contempt, the Blalock court did so only because of binding prece­
dent, not because of analytic agreement with the mandated result. 
The apparent consistency in the two results does not clarify the under­
lying disagreement about the nature of the contempt remedy in Rule 
6(e), which is the focus of this Note. 
This Note will examine the special concurrence in Blalock and 
the dissent in Barry and compare and contrast them with the majority 
opinion in Barry as a way of determining whether the express con­
tempt provision in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) is crim­
inal and/or civil. Part I of the Note examines the historical evolution 
of grand jury secrecy and its incorporation into the American criminal 
justice system. The legislative history of Rule 6(e) will be examined in 
Part II, with particular emphasis on the 1977 amendments. The in­
herent supervisory powers of the courts as they relate to both criminal 
and civil contempt will be examined generally in Part III. Addition­
ally, Part III will examine the nature, purposes and possible definitions 
of criminal and civil contempt. Part IV discusses cases where grand 
jury secrecy violations were alleged. Cases prior to 1977 will be ex­
§ 1020.50 (Supp. 1989). See infra notes 224-41 and accompanying text for a detailed dis­
cussion of the Lance case. 
15. 844 F.2d at 1552 (Tjoftat, J., Roettger, J., specially concurring). 
16. 610 F.2d at 212. 
17. 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
18. Id. at 1322 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
19. Id. at 1326. 
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amined for applications of the safeguards used by the courts before the 
enactment of the contempt provision in Rule 6(e). Cases since 1977 
will be explored to help illuminate the current application of the rule. 
Part V of the Note examines the Blalock and Barry decisions in detail. 
Part VI focuses on the special concurrence in Blalock and the majority 
opinion in Barry to determine if criminal contempt was the sole con­
tempt sanction intended by Congress when it enacted the 1977 amend­
ments to Rule 6(e). 
This Note suggests that the legislative history is unclear about the 
nature of the contempt remedy in Rule 6(e). The underlying philoso­
phy and history of grand jury secrecy, regularly recognized by the 
Supreme Court, must be considered in any remedy for secrecy viola­
tions. Traditional judicial distinctions between civil and criminal con­
tempts and the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts to 
fashion remedies are useful as a guide for courts confronted with gov­
ernmental violations of grand jury secrecy. An analysis based on such 
considerations is more effective than one based on a categorical ap­
proach which eliminates civil contempt. 
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GRAND JURY SECRECY 
Today the grand jury is primarily a way of accusing a defendant 
of an alleged crime.20 Although historically the accusatory function 
was fused with the actual trial,21 the modem grand jury does not serve 
as a trial jury. Currently the grand jury, which is the investigatory 
arm of the government, decides only whether there is sufficient evi­
dence to indict an individual who will subsequently go to trial. Func­
tionally, the grand jury serves not only as a means "of bringing 
persons who are suspected of crimes to trial upon just grounds, but of 
protecting citizens from unfounded accusations whether from the gov­
ernment, partisan passion, or personal enmity."22 This dual function 
20. Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REv. 461, 462 (1959). 
21. Id. (In ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and the Scandinavian countries, citi­
zens accused, tried, and convicted those alleged to have committed crimes.). 
22. Id. at 484-85 (citing Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992 (C.C.D. Cal. 
1872»; see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), which stated: 
Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the inno­
cent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable 
function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether 
the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a 
charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by 
malice and personal ill will. 
Id. at 390. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), Justice Harlan explained the 
protective function of secrecy: '. 
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of the grand jury, serving both the governmental needs of prosecution 
and the individual's needs to be protected from unwarranted charges, 
has resulted in the "veil of secrecy" which historically reduced royal 
control and guaranteed the independence of the grand jury.23 
Although theoretically secrecy protects the target of a grand jury 
probe against reputational damage, in reality secrecy also screens the 
prosecutor's actions before the grand jury from public scrutiny.24 
A. Historical Development of Grand Jury Secrecy 
The modem grand jury has its roots in the reign of the Carlovin­
gian kings (circa 700-800 A.D.)2S whose inquisition evolved from Ro­
man practices (43 A.D. to circa 500 A.D.).26 By 1166, the Assize of 
Clarendon was established by Henry 11,27 whereby sixteen men under 
oath informed the government on affairs of state and decided who in 
the community had committed crimes.28 The Assize drew members 
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and helpless-pro­
scribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an unreasoning public 
clamor-have found, and will continue to find, security against official oppres­
sion, the cruelty of mobs, the machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of 
private persons who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their 
personal enemies. 
Id. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
23. Brown, The Witness and Grand Jury Secrecy, 11 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169, 169-71 
(1983). To ensure secrecy, grand jurors were required to take an oath of secrecy in English 
courts. The oath appeared as early as 1600 and violations were punishable as a crime. Id. 
at 171 nn.9-1O. See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the grand 
jury's independence and the supervisory function of the court. See also United States v. 
Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) ("The same concern for the grand jury's dual 
function underlies the 'long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury 
proceedings in the federal courts.' " (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 
U.S. 677, 681 (1958) (footnote omitted»). In In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971), 
the court traced the history of grand jury secrecy: 
Thus, it is important to note that the common law concept of grand jury secrecy 
developed from a need to protect the jurors and the accused from the tyranny of 
the Crown: Secrecy insulated the jurors from the pressures of the Crown and 
pennitted the grand jury to guard the people against the oppressive power of 
autocratic government. 
Id. at 568-69. 
24. See infra notes 59-64, 174-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role 
of the prosecutor in grand jury investigations. 
25. Whyte, supra note 20, at 463. 
26. Id. at 462. 
27. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 613, 613 (1983); Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a 
New Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 307,307 (1969). 
28. M. EVANS & R. JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CoNSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 14 (1984), taken from the original Latin text contained in the appendix to Roger 
of Howden's CHRONICA, which stated: 
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from the community who heard testimony, deliberated in public, and 
made accusations against their neighbors.29 This procedure, which 
raised a presumption of guilt, eventually resulted in a centralization 
and increase of royal power. Contrary to the purposes ascribed to the 
grand jury today, this community group did not protect the individ­
ual's rights. 3D The Assize may have indirectly protected the individual 
by screening unfounded charges, thus making the court's work more 
efficient.3 1 
In 1215, the Latern Council abolished the trial by ordeal and 
compurgation and the accused was tried by an indicting jury. 32 
"Here, it is said, the seed of the grand jury acting as a protective buffer 
between the accused and government officials was sown."33 Although 
1. In the first place the aforesaid King Henry, on the advice of all his bar­
ons, for the preservation of peace, and for the maintenance ofjustice, has decreed 
that enquiry shall be made throughout the several counties and throughout the 
several hundreds through twelve of the more lawful men of the hundred and' 
through four of the more lawful men of each vill upon oath that they will speak 
the truth, whether there be in their hundred or vill any man accused or notori­
ously suspect of being a robber or murderer or thief, or any who is a receiver of 
robbers or murderers or thieves, since the lord king has been king. And let the 
justices enquire into this among themselves and the sheriffs among themselves. 
Id. 
29. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455, 456-57 (1965). 
30. See M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, stating that: 

Henry II, in promulgating the Assize of Clarendon, was not in the least con­

cerned with creating a shield for the citizen in his dealings with the state. The 

Grand Assize was established to enable the king to wrest the administration of 
justice from the Church and the feudal barons. The grand jury would be primar­
ily a weapon for the monarch-enforcing his law, whether or not that could aptly 
be called at any given time the "king's peace." 
Id. at 7; Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1103 (1955), stating that: 
The assize expressly provided for trial by the ordeal by water, wherein the ac­
cused was slowly lowered by rope into a body of water. His innocence was vindi­
cated by his sinking; if he floated, he was found guilty. For those who might 
survive this ordeal, the assize specifically provided the imposition of banishment 
and outlawry. These sanctions were invoked although the accusation and submis­
sion to the ordeal, not necessarily based on direct evidence of guilt, might have 
been solely premised on the local opinion that the prisoner was guilty. If con­
victed, punishment was the loss of a foot .... 
Id. at 1107 n.14. 
31. Whyte, supra note 20, at 465. 
32. Kuh, supra 'note 30, at 1107 ("Trial by ordeal and compurgation were finally 
abandoned, partially because of church dissatisfaction with methods that, having no logical 
relationship to gUilt or innocence, too often resulted in the acquittal of persons deemed to 
be heretics. "). Compurgation is "the clearing of an accused person by oaths of persons who 
swear to his veracity or innocence." WEBSTER'S NEW CoLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 230 
(1979). 
33. Whyte, supra note 20, at 465. 
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the accused was now afforded some minor protection from this devel­
opment, which afforded a more rational means for determining the 
truth, he was not completely free of royal control of the grand jury. 
Not only was the panel that had accused the defendant unlikely to 
acquit at trial, the royal judges regularly fined and imprisoned jurors 
who found the defendant not guilty.34 Given that such contradictory 
behavior was disfavored by the Crown, the accused did not have much 
hope for success at later judicial proceedings. 35 
The modem notion of the grand jury "stems directly from the 
'grande inquest' of twenty-three men which sheriffs began to appoint 
during the time of Edward 111."36 In the fourteenth century, the prac­
tice of hearing witnesses in private became a feature of the grand 
jury.37 However, the rule of secrecy was not part of the proceedings 
until 1681 at the trial of the Earl of Shaftsbury, where members of the 
grand jury heard the charges of treason and refused to conduct the 
proceedings in public or allow the presence of the royal prosecutors 
during testimony. 38 The subsequent refusal of the grand jury to indict 
the accused raised a case of treason to a symbol against oppression and 
despotism of the royal power. Secrecy became the touchstone of 
34. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALlS, supra note 2, at 9 (It is unlikely that this punish­
ment is the ancestor of sanctions for violations of grand jury secrecy, because it was directly 
related to a violation of the royal will rather than a sanction to protect the individual's 
rights.). 
35. Whyte, supra note 20, at 466. 
36. Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C.L. REV. 
290, 293 (1959). 
37. Whyte, supra note 20, at 466. 
38. Pickholz & Pickholz, Grand Jury Secrecy and the Administrative Agency: Bal­
ancing Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime Against Traditional Safeguards, 36 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1029-30 (1979); see also L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 9-12 
(1975). The grand jury was often the center ofpolitica1 struggles. Shaftsbury and his fol­
lower, Stephen Colledge, supported the continued hegemony of the Anglican Church dur­
ing the reign of Charles II, an avowed Catholic. The king's attempts to indict Shaftsbury 
and Colledge in public were met with the concerns of the grand jurors who thought "sus­
pects would be alerted and would abscond, and suborning of perjury would be facilitated." 
Id. at 10. It is possible that the resistance to the royal authority stemmed from religious 
sympathies with the accused rather than any laudatory notions of establishing the indepen­
dence of the grand jury. The king was able to have an indictment returned against Col­
ledge by a more favorable grand jury. Shaftsbury fled England to escape the same fate. 
The foreman of the grand jury that refused to indict Colledge in London was arrested and 
forced to flee the country, further evidencing the king's control of the grand jury system. 
See generally Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role ofthe Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 701, 710-21 (1972); Comment, Federal Grand Jury Secrecy, 5 GONZ. L. REv. 255, 
256 (1970) ("[A] significant change in the grand jury's function came ... in 1681. ... 
[W]ith the Lord Shaftsbury case, the tide of history changed, and the grand jury grew more 
independent from the Crown." (footnotes omitted». 
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grand jury independence.39 
B. Grand Jury Secrecy in American Criminal Procedure 
The rule of secrecy in England stemmed from "the desire to pro­
tect ... defendants and the existence of the grand jury itself."4O Eng­
lish legal institutions and attitudes, such as the fear of government 
oppression, were brought to this country. The colonial experience 
under British rule underscored the wisdom of a healthy distrust of 
centralized government. In addition to overseeing the welfare of the 
community,41 colonial grand juries protested abuses by the English 
royal emissaries and urged the people to support the independence of 
the colonies.42 
In the most celebrated case of colonial grand jury independence 
in this country, a New York grand jury mirrored the earlier English 
grand jury refusal to bow to royal authority. In 1734, William Cosby, 
the English governor of New York, sought two indictments for crimi­
nallibel against Peter Zenger, a journalist who had published articles 
critical of Cosby. The grand jury refused to indict both times and 
Zenger was able to thwart subsequent attempts to punish him.43 The 
grand jury's ability to protect against royal excesses was once again 
hailed as a bulwark against despotism. 
After the end of British rule, the Americans incorporated the fear 
of repression into the Bill of Rights in the fifth amendment guarantee, 
"[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa­
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
39. M. FRANKEL & G. NAfTALIS, supra note 2, at 9 ("About the same time, the 
grand jury began to hear testimony in private, a practice that gave rise to grand jury se­
crecy, which remains a fundamental concept today."); see Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 
38, at 1030. 
40. Comment, supra note 27, at 308. 
41. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1634-1941 2 (1963) ("Grand juries acted in the nature of local assemblies: making 
known the wishes of the people, proposing new laws, protesting against abuses in govern­
ment, performing administrative tasks, and looking after the welfare of their 
communities. "). 
42. M. FRANKEL & G. NAfTALIS, supra note 2, at 11-12; see also L. CLARK, supra 
note 38, at 13 (The first grand jury was established in Massachusetts in 1635 and by 1683 
all the colonies had a grand jury in some form.). See generally Whyte, supra note 20, at 
466-71 (The Governor of Virginia ordered justices to make court proceedings as close as 
possible to English legal institutions.). 
43. Kuh, supra note 30, at 1108-09. The date of 1734 for the Peter Zenger incident 
does not have unanimous agreement in the secondary sources. M. FRANKEL & G. 
NAfTALIS, supra note 2, at 11, give the date as 1743. The Note, supra note I, at 590, gives 
the date as 1734, which agrees with the Kuh article, supra note 30, at 1108-09 n.19. Yet 
another date (1735) is given in L. CLARK, supra note 38, at 18. 
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Jury."44 By incorporation into the Bill of Rights, which was intended 
"mainly for the security of personal rights,"45 the Americans recog­
nized that the "ultimate function of the secrecy privilege was for the 
protection of the rights of the accused. "46 The American grand jury 
was a close cousin to its English counterpart and operated similarly to 
the English mode1.47 Although the grand jury remains intact in the 
federal sphere, it is not required in state criminal prosecutions. In 
1859, Michigan became the first state to eliminate the requirement 
that a criminal prosecution be initiated by a grandjury.48 In 1884, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the requirement of an indict­
ment by the grand jury was not applicable to the states.49 
The Supreme Court has upheld the need for grand jury secrecy in 
44. u.s. CONST. amend. V; see also United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc. 463 U.S. 418, 
423 (1983) ("The grand jury has always occupied a high place as an instrument ofjustice in 
our system of criminallaw-so much so that it is enshrined in the Constitution." (citing 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959»; Costello v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956». But see M. FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2, 
at 118-19, where the authors discuss the fact that there have been many suggestions for 
reform, including abolition of the grand jury. "The effort to alter the Fifth Amendment 
encounters a deep-seated conviction among many constitutional lawyers and scholars that 
it is dangerous to tamper with any part of the Bill of Rights, which has remained exactly as 
it was adopted nearly two hundred years ago. Any change ... may be the start of fatal 
breaches." Id. at 118. 
45. 	 Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. I, 6 (1887). 
46. Knudsen, Pretrial Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 60 F.R.D. 237, 
241-42 (1974). 
47. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 362 (1956) (The grand jury was "brought to this country 
by the early colonists and incorporated in the Constitution by the Founders. There is every 
reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially 
like its English progenitor."); Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 38, at 1030. But see M. 
FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2, at 16 (The grand jury was abolished in England in 
1933.); Knudsen, supra note 46, at 237 n.3 (The English abolished the grand jury system 
because it was an expensive burden on the citizenry ,that performed no useful function.). 
48. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2, at 16. 
49. 	 In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Court held that: 
Tried by these principles, we are unable to say that the substitution for a 
presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information, after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of 
the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross­
examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of 
law.... It is merely a preliminary proceeding, and can result in no final judg­
ment, except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial, conducted precisely as 
in cases of indictments. 
Id. at 538; see also Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 688 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The basis for this 
distinction results from the now well-settled constitutional holding that the Fifth Amend­
ment right to a grand jury does not apply to state prosecutions." (quoting Aldridge v. 
Marshall, 765 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986) (citations 
omitted»). 
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American criminal procedure. 50 Confidentiality of grand jury pro­
ceedings protects several important, yet often competing, interests of 
the government and of private citizens. This tradition of secrecy, 
which had its historical roots in England, is, according to the Supreme 
Court, as "important for the protection of the innocent as for the pur­
suit of the guilty."51 Justice Brennan summed up the rationale: 
Essentially four reasons have been advanced as justification for 
grand jury secrecy. (1) To prevent the accused from escaping before 
he is indicted and arrested or from tampering with the witnesses 
against him. (2) To prevent disclosure of derogatory information 
presented to the grand jury against an accused who has not been 
indicted. (3) To encourage complainants and witnesses to come 
before the grand jury and speak freely without fear that their testi­
mony will be made public thereby subjecting them to possible dis­
comfort or retaliation. (4) To encourage the grand jurors to engage 
in uninhibited investigation and deliberation by barring disclosure 
of their votes and comments during the proceedings. 52 
The four principal reasons given by Justice Brennan incorporate 
the traditional rationale for grand jury secrecy: the "sword" which 
aids the state in effective criminal investigations and the "shield" 
which protects both the accused and the grand jurors from govern­
mental intrusion and oppression. The fourth reason, protection of the 
grand jurors, is of "paramount importance."53 Rule 6(e) prohibits 
either disclosure or recording of the grand jury's deliberations or 
votes54 because citizens who assume the duty of grand juror must be 
protected by law to prevent any subsequent injury that might result 
from public knowledge of their discussions. Grand jury deliberations 
and votes are kept permanently secret. The first reason is important to 
50. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983); Douglas Oil Co. v. 
Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958); United States v. 10hnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943). 
51. 319 U.S. at 513. 
52. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395,405 (1959) (Brennan, 
1., dissenting) (foot~ote omitted); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 
1954); see also United States v. Geller, 154 F. Supp. 727, 729 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (Secrecy 
of the grand jury is an administrative necessity.); Application of United Electrical, Radio & 
Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Secrecy before the indictment 
protects the accused in case no indictment is returned against him. If an indictment is 
returned it prevents possible prejudice at trial.); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 
304 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (The rule of secrecy is not for the benefit of the defendant after an 
indictment has been returned. The rule protects the grand jurors and helps the government 
in its prosecution.). 
53. Calkins, supra note 29, at 459. 
54. See supra note 4 for the text of Rule 6(e)(I). 
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the government because an accused may flee before he can be appre­
hended and placed in custody if he knows of charges pending against 
him.!!!! Additionally, the accused could collude with witnesses to tes­
tify falsely on his behalf. The third reason is also important to the 
government during the preparation phase of its investigation. "Se­
crecy is the state's inducement for obtaining evidence"56 sufficient for 
an indictment. Only the second reason addresses the need of an indi­
vidual to be protected against public condemnation or suspicion. Per­
manent secrecy of the grand jury materials is required to protect a 
target who is unindicted by the grand jury. 57 " 
Historical and political realities remain embedded in the contin­
ued respect accorded grand jury secrecy by the jUdiciary. 58 However, 
"the current reality of how the federal grand jury operates reveals a less 
55. Knudsen, supra note 46, at 240 ("Although there is disagreement as to the origi­
nal reasons for grand jury proceedings being held in secret, the most likely reason was to 
prevent offenders from learning of the proceedings and attempting to escape prosecution." 
(footnote omitted». 
56. Calkins, supra note 29, at 459. 
57. Id. at 460. 
58. In United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983), the defendants were 
indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to defraud the United States through de­
fense contracts. In Ii plea bargain, the defendants agreed to plead guilty to a count of 
conspiracy to obstruct an IRS investigation. The government moved for disclosure of the 
grand jury materials to attorneys in the Civil Division for use in a possible civil suit. The 
Supreme Court held that the government attorneys in the Civil Division could not have 
automatic access to such materials. The government had to obtain a court order under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(C)(i). Rule 6(A)(i)'s provisions of automatic access 
are limited to attorneys involved in the criminal investigation before the grand jury. Justice 
Brennan, writing for the majority, stated: 
This conclusion is mandated by the general purposes and policies of grand jury 
secrecy ... and by the legislative history of Rule 6(e). 
Given the strong historic policy of preserving grand jury secrecy, one might 
wonder why Government attorneys are given any automatic access at all . 
. . . [Disclosure] threatens to do affirmative mischief. The problem is three­
fold. First, disclosure to Government bodies raises much the same concerns that 
underlie the rule of secrecy in other contexts .... [A witness] may be less willing 
to speak for fear that he will get himself into trouble in some other forum. 
Second, because the Government takes an active part in the activities of the 
grand jury, disclosure to Government attorneys ... poses a significant threat to 
the integrity of the grand jury itself. . . . 
Third, ... there are few if any other forums in which a governmental body 
has such relatively unregulated power to compel other persons to divulge infor­
mation or produce evidence .... [T]he limitations imposed on investigation and 
discovery exist for sound reasons--ranging from fundamental fairness to concern 
about burdensomeness and intrusiveness. 
Id. at 427-28, 431-33 (citation omitted). 
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clear picture of an independent body cautiously supervised by the 
court. 
Noteworthy in the traditional purposes and policies advanced by 
the Supreme Court for preserving secrecy of the grand jury is the ab­
sence of any rationale supporting the government's need to keep its 
investigatory behavior (as opposed to "matters occurring before the 
grand jury," as required in Rule 6(e)) from public scrutiny. 59 The 
freedom that secrecy provides to the grand jurors to investigate and to 
the witnesses to testify is not historically related to sheltering the gov­
ernment from any judicial or public scrutiny of its practices. This as­
pect of the grand jury has been criticized: "Save for torture, it would 
be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of 
unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination. . . . [T]he Supreme 
Court has shown itself extremely sensitive to the opportunities for op­
pression that such examination offers."60 
As its inception at the trial of Shaftsbury indicates, the secrecy 
provision originally precluded the presence of the government. The 
erosion of this concept has resulted in the prosecutor exercising discre­
59. Cf In re Grand Jury Matter (Catania), 682 F.2d 61, 62-65 (3d Cir. 1982) (One 
of the threshold questions in deciding whether there has been a breach of grand jury se­
crecy is to decide if the information in question is in fact grand jury material. Grand jury 
material has been defined as only that material which directly or indirectly reveals what 
transpired before the grand jury. If material is obtained from an independent source, it is 
not grand jury material under the Rule 6(e) definition.). See Calkins, supra note 29, stating: 
In examining the evolution of grand jury secrecy, it is important to note that 
the common-law concept of secrecy that was imparted to American jurisprudence 
arose initially from a need to protect the grand jurors and private citizens from 
the oppression of the state. It was not intended to aid the prosecution in its dis­
covery of facts or to protect the prosecution's case from disclosure. 
Id. at 458. 
60. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 
U.S. 913 (1954); see also In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), where Justice Black stated in 
dissent: 
Secret inquisitions are dangerous things justly feared by free men every­
where. They are the breeding place for arbitrary misuse of official power. They 
are often the beginning of tyranny as well as indispensable instruments for its 
survival. Modem as well as ancient history bears witness that both innocent and 
guilty have been seized by officers of the state and whisked away for secret inter­
rogation or worse until the groundwork has been securely laid for their inevitable 
conviction. While the labels applied to this practice have frequently changed, the 
central idea ... remains unchanging-extraction of "statements" by one means or 
another from an individual by officers of the state while he is held incommuni­
cado. . . . [I]t violates the Due Process Clause to compel a person to answer 
questions at a secret interrogation where he is denied legal assistance and where 
he is subject to the uncontrolled and invisible exercise of power by government 
officials. Such procedures are a grave threat to the liberties of a free people. 
Id. at 352-53 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
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tion in conducting the investigation of the grand jury,61 with the ne­
cessity of extending the secrecy requirement to the prosecutor. The 
policy of government intrusion into the grand jury developed through­
out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such that today it is a mat­
ter of right.62 However, the prosecutor's access and use of grand jury 
material is restricted by judicial supervision of the Executive's ac­
tions.63 "[G]overnment attorneys are allowed into grand jury rooms, 
not for the general and multifarious purposes of the Department of 
Justice, but because both the grand jury's functions and their own 
prosecutorial duties require it."64 The grand jury remains an arm of 
the judiciary, under its supervision, despite the necessary guidance of 
the prosecutor. 
Congress has also sought to "defend [grand jury secrecy] ... 
against unwarranted intrusion."6s Rule 6(e), as originally enacted in 
1946, limited use of grand jury materials to government attorneys in 
the performance of their duties. The 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e), 
which relaxed the restrictions on disclosure by government attorneys, 
advanced the government's interest in criminal prosecutions and at­
tempted to curb abuse by restricting automatic access to grand jury 
materials and by imposing sanctions upon violators of grand jury 
secrecy. 
61. Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Grand Jury: Dismissal ofIndictments Pur­
suant to the Federal Supervisory Power, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 133 (1987); see also In 
re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971), which stated: 
Over the years, as fear of the oppressive power of the government has sub­
sided, the government prosecutor has regained substantive influence over the 
grand jury and, consequently, that institution has lost much of its former inde­
pendence. The grand jury now relies upon the prosecutor to initiate and prepare 
criminal cases and investigations which come before it. The government attorney 
is present while the jury hears testimony; he calls and questions the witnesses and 
he draws the indictment. The only remnant of secrecy with respect to the govern­
ment which adheres today is the practice of conducting the actual deliberations 
and voting of the jury in private. . 
Id. at 569 (citation omitted). The modem grand jury has been criticized for its adherence 
to secrecy. See generally Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 
A.B.A. J. 153 (1965); Calkins, supra note 29; Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical 
Stage?, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807 (1972); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable 
Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REV. 668 (1962). 
62. Calkins, supra note 29, at 458. 
63. See infra notes 336-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inherent 
supervisory powers of the judiciary over the grand jury. 
64. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 429 (1983). 
65. Id. at 425. 
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II. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e) 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) has embodied the long­
established rule of grand jury secrecy since 1946, when the criminal 
rules of procedure for the federal courts went into effect. The rule, as 
originally enacted, continued the common law practice in the federal 
courts-"The policy of secrecy is traditional, and violation of the re­
quired ... oath ... is both a contempt and acrlme at common law."66 
Prior to the 1977 amendments, Rule 6(e) was amended in 1966 to ex­
tend secrecy to the auxiliary personnel who recorded and transcribed 
the testimony of witnesses.67 
A. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) in 1946 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1946,68 
codified in Rule 6(e) the common law rule requiring secrecy of grand 
jury proceedings. Rule 6 on the Grand Jury (originally Rule 7 in the 
preliminary draft) did not change the traditional common law form of 
the grand jury.69 However, the new rule enhanced the "effectiveness 
of the grand jury by permitting greater flexibility in its use," particu­
larly in the area of numbers of grand juries that can be summoned at 
the same period of time and the length of service.70 
Rule 6(e) dealt with the "frequently troublesome problem"71 of 
66. Dession, The New Federal Rules 0/ Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 
203 n.97 (1941) [hereinafter Dession II]. 
67. See supra note 4 for the text of Rule 6(e)(I) and (2). 
68. See Fed. R. Crim. P., 327 U.S. 821 (1946); see also Dession, The New Federal 
Rules 0/ Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694 (1946) [hereinafter Dession I]; Dession 
II, supra note 66; Orfield, The Federal Rules o/Criminal Procedure, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 543 
(1945). In 1941, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee to draft the origi­
nal Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court approved the draft rules in 1944 and 
submitted them to Congress. The Rules took effect on March 21,1946. Dession I, supra, at 
694-97. The Advisory Committee to the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
prepared at least ten drafts, "a laborious eight-year enterprise which required the participa­
tion of ... judges, lawyers, government officers, legal scholars, and committees of bench 
and bar." Id. at 694. The result of this work, where all those interested in criminal proce­
dure could make known their needs, was a comprehensive code originating from every 
known source. The rules which were confined to general principles embodied the following 
objectives: promotion of simplification of procedure; improvement in objectively ascertain­
ing the facts; more complete fulfillment of democratic values; and greater uniformity. 
Orfield, supra, at 544. 
69. Dession II, supra note 66, at 197 (The drafters could not change the requirement 
for a grand jury in light of the Constitutional mandate for a grand jury for prosecution of 
any felony.). 
70. Id. at 198. 
71. Id. at 203. The text of the original Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 
provided: 
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations 
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the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. The secrecy provision es­
sentially restated the traditional ~equirement of secrecy with two im­
portant exceptions. The first exception was the provision for 
disclosure. The rule continued the practice of allowing disclosure to 
government attorneys to the extent that they are present in the room 
when the evidence is presented.72 Additionally, to save time and facil­
itate proof, disclosure was permitted by the court when a defendant 
made a good faith motion to dismiss an indictment. The second ex­
ception was the provision that no obligation of secrecy could be im­
posed on any person except in accordance with the rule. Prior to the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, witnesses took 
the oath of secrecy, a restriction deemed "impractical and unfair."73 
The original rule made no mention of sanctions for violations of the 
rule. 
Rule 6(e), as adopted in 1946, contained no provision for nonat­
torneys assisting the government to access grand jury materials for 
other purposes. The only provision relating to such activities stated: 
"Disclosure ... may be made to ... the attorneys for the government 
for use in the performance of their duties. "74 Despite this language 
restricting access and use of grand jury materials. the Justice Depart­
ment, faced with the reality of complex litigation, consulted a multi­
tude of specialists. who in turn had to be apprised of what had 
transpired before the grand jury. It became "common in some Dis-
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use 
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise Ii juror, attorney, interpreter or 
stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so 
directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding 
or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing 
that.grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters 
occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon 
any persons except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct that an 
indictment shaII be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail, 
and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shaII disclose 
the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execu­
tion of a warrant or summons. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1946). 
72. Orfield, supra note 68, at 549. 
73. Dession II, supra note 66, at 204 (Witnesses should be able to make disclosures 
to counsel to prevent unnecessary hardship.). See generally Brown, supra note 23 (The 
trend toward imposing secrecy on witnesses before the grand jury, despite the general pro­
hibition of the rule and the first amendment limitations of such an imposition, further 
increases the prosecutor's control over the grand jury and increases the "sword" aspect of 
the grand jury's work.). 
74. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 821, 837 (1946). See supra note 71 for the text of 
the original Rule 6(e). 
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tricts for nonattorneys to be shown grand jury materials. "75 The 1977 
amendments to Rule 6(e) addressed this problem .. 
B. 1977 Amendments to Rule 6(e)76 
In the 1970's, regulatory agencies were referring economic viola­
tions of their regulatory statutes to prosecutors for criminal proceed­
ingS.77 Courts struggled with this erosion of keeping the "sovereign" 
out of the grand jury room. The first case that prompted statutory 
consideration of the problem was In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons.78 
There, the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania de­
nied the petitioner's motion for a protective order to prevent IRS ac­
cess to materials the petitioner had given to the grand jury pursuant to 
a subpoena. Although the IRS had access to the material while pro­
viding technical assistance to the prosecutor, the information was not 
requested in connection with a civil tax prosecution. The court would 
not issue a protective order "so long as [the records] ... remain under 
the aegis of attorneys for the government. "79 
Five years later, the same court considered Robert Hawthorne, 
Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue,8o where the plaintiff sought an 
injunction to halt grand jury proceedings or an order restraining the 
use of subpoenaed documents by the IRS. The plaintiff alleged that 
the IRS had corporate records that had been given to the grand jury 
and that the IRS agents had not been sworn to secrecy or advised that 
the materials needed to remain under the "aegis" of the United States 
Attorney. Although the plaintiff did not prevail, the court expressed 
concern "as to the manner in which the Rule 6(e) orders were imple­
mented in this case and apparently in general."81 Both parties relied 
on Pflaumer as the sole authority. The court "suggested" the proper 
procedures to be followed when agency personnel have access to grand 
75. 463 U.S. at 436. 
76. See supra note 4 for the text of Rule 6(e)(2), which was amended in 1966 to 
include the operator of a recording device and any typist who transcribes recorded 
testimony among those bound by secrecy, and for the text of Rule 6(e)(1), which was 
amended in 1979 to require the recordation of all grand jury· prOceedings except 
deliberations and voting. 
77. See generally Hassett, Ex Parte Pre-Trial Discovery: The Real Vice of Parallel 
Investigations, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049 (1979); Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 38; 
Note, Federal Agency Access to Grand Jury Transcripts Under Rule 6(e), 80 MICH. L. REV. 
1665 (1982). 
78. 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7 n.lO, 
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 531. 
79. 53 F.R.D. at 477. 
80. 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
81. Id. at 1104. 
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jury materials.82 The Hawthorne court submitted this order,83 as well 
as its Pflaumer decision, to the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States.84 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a similar 
problem in J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States,85 where the petitioner 
challenged the use of grand jury materials by IRS agents who had 
assisted the grand jury. Judge Hufstedler held that agency access to 
grand jury materials must be restricted because the "grand jury is a 
constitutional entity under court supervision, not a tool available for 
Executive branch purposes."86 Judge Hufstedler recommended the 
guidelines suggested by the Hawthorne court and added that the 
"agency bears the burden of proving an independent source for the 
information."87 
While the courts were balancing the need for secrecy against the 
government's need "to make use of outside expertise in complex litiga­
tion,"88 the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Ju­
dicial Conference of the United States and the Supreme Court began 
to consider the problem of agency access to grand jury materials and 
the resulting uncertainty from the judicial decisions. The amendment, 
proposed by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules,89 reflected 
82. Id. at 1125-27. The suggestions included: 1) All persons giving assistance should 
be sworn to secrecy and written instructions should clarify the restricted use of the materi­
als. 2) Grand jury materials must be segregated and marked as separate from agency files. 
3) Before granting a request for specialized assistance there should be a strict showing of 
necessity. 4) A detailed docket would keep track of the agency personnel with access to 
what particular grand jury materials including dates when the agency was granted access. 
83. Id. at 1126 n.54. 
84. Id. at 1121. 
85. 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9146, at 86,195 (9th Cir. 1976). 
86. Id. at 86,197. 
87. Id. at 86,199. 
88. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, re­
printed in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 527,529; HOUSE DOCUMENT, supra 
note 7, at 8. 
89. See 8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 6.01 [6][b) (2d ed. 1990) for the 
Proposed 1977 Amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provided: 
6(e) SECRECY OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCLOSURE. Disclosure of matters occur­
ring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror 
may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of 
their duties. For purposes of this subdivision, "attorneys for the government" in­
cludes those enumerated in rule 54(c); it also includes such other government per­
sonnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the 
performance of their duties. Otherwise, a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenogra­
pher, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testi­
mony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed 
by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when 
permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that 
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the fact that government personnel assisted the JUstice Department in 
grand jury proceedings because the increased volume and complexity 
of litigation required increased specialization.9O The Advisory Com­
mittee Notes to the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) were submitted to 
Congress on April 26, 1976 by the Supreme Court.91 The proposed 
changes continued to permit disclosure to government attorneys under 
the original rule, but expanded the definition to include those individu­
als defined by Rule 54(C).92 In addition to those individuals named in 
Rule 54(c), the Advisory Committee included "such other government 
personnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in 
the performance of their duties. "93 The final limitation "in perform­
ance of their duties" was intended as a safeguard to protect against 
unlawful disclosure and to further the policy of grand jury secrecy. 
The Advisory Committee's proposed language for Rule 6(e) did pot 
include sanctions for violations of the rule. 
Because of time pressures, the three days of hearings before the 
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Ju­
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters oc­
curring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any 
person except in accordance with this rule. The federal magistrate to whom an 
indictment is returned may direct that it shall be kept secret until the defendant is 
in custody or has been released pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall seal the 
indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when 
necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
90. Walker, United States v. Sells: Engineering a Result to Promote Grand Jury Se­
crecy, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99, 106 (1983). 
91. The Senate Report to the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) stated: 
The Supreme Court itself does not actually draft the proposed rule or amend­
ment; that work is done by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States. In the case of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that committee is 
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules. The Advisory Committee's draft of 
a proposed rule or amendment is reviewed by the Standing Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, which must give its approval to the draft. Any draft. 
that it approves is forwarded to the Judicial Conference of the United States. If 
the Judicial Conference approves the draft, it forwards the proposed rule or 
amendment to the Supreme Court. The Judicial Conference's role in the 
rulemaking process is defined by 28 U.S.c. 331. 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4 n.l, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 527, 528. 
92. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(c) provides in part: "'[a]ttorney for the 
government' means the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, 
a United States Attorney, [or] an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney." FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 54(c). 
93. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, re­
printed in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 529; HOUSE DOCUMENT, supra 
note 7, at 8 ("The phrase 'other government personnel' includes, but is not limited to, 
employees of administrative agencies and government departments."). 
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diciary were the only hearings conducted on these amendments by 
Congress. Many who testified welcomed the substantive changes in 
Rule 6 from "disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury ... 
may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the per­
formance of their duties" to an expanded definition of attorneys in­
cluding "other government personnel as are necessary to assist the 
attorneys for the government in the performance of their duties." 
However, concerns were expressed at the hearings about the scope of 
such changes and the possible effects on targets if grand jury informa­
tion were made more widely available to government attorneys not 
directly involved with the grand jury.94 
The House was primarily concerned about access to materials by 
personnel outside. the Department of Justice: 
The substantive change to Rule 6(e) has been much criticized. 
There was concern that it would pennit too broad an exception to 
the rule of keeping grand jury proceedings secret. It was feared that 
the proposed change would allow Government agency personnel to 
obtain grand jury infonnation which they could later use in connec­
tion with an unrelated civil or criminal case. This would enable 
those agencies to circumvent statutes that specifically circumscribe 
the investigative procedure otherwise available to them.95 
The House voted to disapprove the amendments because of the 
inadequate protection against improper use by government personnel 
not directly involved in the grand jury investigation. The House did 
not submit alternative language. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee redrafted the rule.96 The Senate 
Report favored the Supreme Court's proposal and found the Haw­
thorne and Simp/ot decisions too "restrictive of the use of government 
experts."91 The report specifically stated that the relaxation of restric­
tions on secrecy of the government attorneys was: 
necessary to facilitate the perfonnance of their duties relating to 
criminal law enforcement. On the other hand, the Rule seeks to 
allay the concerns of those who fear that such prosecutorial power 
will lead to misuse of the grand jury to enforce non-criminal Fed­
94. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 19-56,66-71,85-95, 105-06, 111-14, 147-81,204,229-30,246-47 (1977) [hereinaf­
ter Hearings]. 
95. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. 
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2,5-8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 527, 528-32. 
97. [d. at 7 n.lO, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 530-31. 
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erallaws by (1) providing a clear prohibition, subject to the penalty 
of contempt and (2) requiring that a court order under paragraph 
(C) be obtained to authorize such a disclosure.98 
The concerns expressed reflected the balancing necessary to maintain 
secrecy as government attorneys legitimately needed to make material 
available to others in the government. The Senate version, which was 
ultimately adopted without significant opposition, included a con­
tempt provision for violations of Rule 6(e).99 
The basic reason for expanding the scope of permissible disclo­
sure was to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement. Secondary 
reasons included providing certainty to attorneys seeking assistance in 
grand jury investigations and encouraging efficient investigations with­
out judicial delay. Although the amendment expanded the use of 
grand jury materials by government personnel, it also sought to bal­
ance such expansion with the express safeguard of contempt for viola~ 
tions found in Rule 6(e).100 The rule attempted to clarify who was 
granted access to grand jury materials, but was unclear as to whether 
criminal or civil contempt was envisioned as the sanction to guarantee 
the necessary secrecy. To help clarify the nature of the contempt pro­
vision expressly provided in Rule 6(e), a general examination of con­
tempt as traditionally used by the courts is useful. 
III. CoNTEMPT OF COURT 
Contempt of court is an act or omission obstructing or disrupting 
the proper functioning of the judicial process. 101 The power to hold 
an individual in contempt of court is the means by which the judicial 
system protects itself from disorder in the courtroom, compels compli­
ance with court orders, and protects litigants in an action before the 
court. The power of contempt allows courts to protect "systemic val­
ues by deterring official misconduct and preserving the appearance of 
fairness,"102 while guaranteeing that prosecutors "act with due regard 
98. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 531-32. 
99. The amendments went into effect on October I, 1977. See Pub. L. No. 95-78, 91 
Stat. 319, 322 (1977). The Rule included the language" [a] knowing violation of Rule 6 
may be punished as a contempt of court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
100. Id. 
101. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 183, 185 (1971). 
"Probably more common is the challenge presented to the administration ofjustice through 
distortion or blocking of its processes obstruction rather than disruption. The distin­
guishing characteristic of obstruction cases is that the contemptuous act tends to subvert 
fairness or efficiency without the direct challenge of disruption." Id. at 189. 
102. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1393-95 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(Norris, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984). The dissent's main argu­
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for the integrity of the administration of justice."103 If courts were 
unable to enforce their orders and control the proceedings before 
them, they would be relegated to "mere boards of arbitration." 104 
The contempt power is an inherent power, lOS largely judge­
made,106 and necessary to the very existence of the court.107 It estab­
lishes and maintains "civilized standards of procedure and evi­
dence."108 As an independent branch of the government. the jUdiciary 
has the powers necessary to function properly, including the power to 
preserve the orderliness of the decision-making process and to enforce 
decisions.109 However, legislation authorizes contempt in specific situ­
ations,ll0 regulates the power, 111 and describes rules governing the 
proceedings. 112 Occasionally legislation "allows" contempt as a way 
ment was that a constitutional rationale was not the only way to dismiss an indictment and 
that limiting the inquiry thus: 
obscures the crucial analytical distinction between that rationale and an alternate 
ground for dismissing an indictment: a court's exercise of its inherent supervisory 
power. 
. . . [W)hile a constitutional analysis focuses on preserving fairness for the 
individual defendant . . . the exercise of a court's inherent supervisory power 
serves two institutional purposes: deterring governmental misconduct and pro­
tecting the integrity of the judicial" process. 
Id. at 1394 (Norris, J., dissenting in part). See infra notes 336-49 for a discussion of the 
inherent supervisory power of the judiciary over the grand jury. 
103. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., 
specially concurring). 
104. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). 
105. Note, Contempt of Court: Wisconsin's Erasure of the Blurred Distinction Be­
tween Civil and Criminal Contempt, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 369 (1983). 
106. Dobbs, supra note 101, at 185 n.3 ("There is an ancient statute that seems as 
remote from the modern power of contempt in logic as it is in time. The Statute of West­
minster II, 13 Edw. I, c. 39 (1285), provided that a sheriff might in some instances im­
prison those who resisted his process. This resembles contempt power, but much as the 
acorn resembles the oak: no one would ever have recognized the resemblance in 
advance."). 
107. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and 
Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 679 (1981). 
108. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). 
109. Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Prosecutor 
and the Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. REV. 484, 496 (1975); see also Note, supra note 61, at 129 
("The federal courts ... possess an inherent supervisory power that allows them to reach 
beyond the Constitution or acts of Congress to establish and maintain civilized standards of 
procedure and evidence." (footnote omitted»; Dobbs, supra note 101, at 184 ("The power 
to preserve courtroom order is clearly essential. Unfortunately, it is easy to shade the need 
for order into a requirement of dignity.... The power to enforce decrees, once made, is 
likewise essential and important, though often enough this is done through execution of 
sentence rather then through the contempt power."). 
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
Ill. 18 U.S.C. §401 (1988). 
112. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). 
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of enforcing behavior without delineating what type of contempt is 
intended and what procedures govern the adjudication of any 
process. 113 
Similarly, Rule 6(e) does not indicate the nature of the contempt 
for violations of grand jury secrecy. The Rule does not regulate con­
tempt as other federal statutes dO,114 it merely authorizes its use for 
specific misconduct. Examining contempt as it has evolved histori­
cally, and as it has been codified in federal statutes, will assist in deter­
mining the nature of the authorized contempt provision in Rule 6(e). 
Additionally, understanding how civil and criminal contempts are ac­
tually defined and used in the federal courts will help with the analysis 
of the nature of the contempt under Rule 6(e). 
A. History of Contempt 
Almost as old as the common law,11s "the massive power of con­
tempt"116 grew up around the concept of contempt of the English 
King's authority. 117 It was a way of assuring the dignity of and re­
spect for the governing sovereign. The early common law deemed dis­
obedience to the King's writ to be contempt and eventually the 
defendant's failure to obey became contempt of the administration of 
justice. I IS The American colonists' legal attitudes were largely a prod­
113. See Hicks ex reL Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 n.4 (1988) (Civil and 
criminal labels of law have become increasingly blurred in the codified laws of contempt. 
For example, in California, civil and criminal contempts are defined in separate statutes, 
but the procedural rules are the same for both.); see also LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 
692-93,153 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1958) ("This power is essential to the existence and function­
ing of our judicial system, and the legislature has no power to take away or materially 
impair it.... However, the legislature may regulate the exercise of the inherent contempt 
power by prescribing rules of practice and procedure."); Comment, Contempt of Court: 
Some Considerations for Reform, 1975 WIS. L. REv. 1117, 1117 (1975) ("[M)ost statutes 
merely recognize the contempt power; they do not define it."). 
114. See in/ra notes 122-29 for a discussion of the federal statutes regulating 
contempt. 
115. Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEO. L.J. 
1513, 1514 (1972) ("It is the antiquity of the contempt power which makes it nearly im­
pregnable, but antiquity must not be confused with validity." (footnote omitted»; see also 
R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 14-19 (1963) (History of English law indicates 
that contempt power dates to the tenth century. There was no greater crime than contempt 
because the King represented divine power and to disobey his representatives was to diso­
bey him directly and, therefore, God.). 
116. Dobbs, supra note 101, at 184. 
117. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, Civil and Criminal Contempt in 
the Federal Courts. 17 F.R.D. 167, 167 (1955). 
118. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 115, at 1-45, stating: 
Justice was as strict as it was swift. In a case in 1631, a man threw a brickbat 
at the Chief Justice after being convicted of a felony. Though he missed the 
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uct of English law; it was natural that the contempt power was copied. 
The JUdiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts "[the] power ... to 
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all 
contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same."119 
The first challenge to the inherent power of an American court to pun­
ish without due process came in 1826 when Judge James Peck dis­
barred and punished an attorney who published an article critical of 
judicial proceedings. 120 Although Judge Peck was impeached and 
eventually acquitted, Congress enacted the Act of March 2, 1831 to 
limit the court's contempt power to three categories of conduct: 1) 
misbehavior "in the presence of the said court[], or so near thereto as 
to obstruct the administration of justice"; 2) misbehavior of an officer 
of the court in "official transactions"; and 3) disobedience or resistance 
to a "lawful" court order.121 
judge, his right hand was cut off and fixed to the gibbet, and he was immediately 
hanged in the presence of the court. 
Id. at 15; see also Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 167-68 
(stating that while originally, "the contempt power was regarded as a means of vindicating 
the court's authority," the concept of using it as a remedy for an adverse party gradually 
evolved, and "this process has sometimes been accelerated by' restrictions of various sorts 
placed upon criminal contempt proceedings"); Fink, Basic Issues in Civil Contempt, 8 
N.M.L. 	REV. 55 (1978), stating: 
Chancery did no more than to coerce the will of a disobedient party until such 
time as he cooperated. The religious, moralistic atmosphere and the degree of 
intimacy thus engendered between Chancellor and litigant with its emphasis on 
duty, obedience and conscience underlies our Anglo-American belief in responsi­
bility for contempt .... It explains how a purely private litigation between parties 
. . . may become, as soon as an injunction issues, a matter personal to the court 
To this double-edged nature of civil contempt must be added the "historical" 
fact that civil contempt is not really contempt at all. Criminal contempt . . . 
corresponds to ... the function of enforcing courtroom order. Historically, there 
was a body of law labeled "contempt" and a distinct equitable procedural device 
which was used to secure obedience to court orders, the so-called contempt in 
procedure. 
Id. at 56 (footnotes omitted). 
119. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83. 
120. Kuhns, supra note 109, at 486. See generally Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 
1376 (1990) (The Supreme Court held that a Florida statute was unconstitutional to the 
extent that it prohibited disclosure of the reporter's own testimony after the tenn of the 
grand jury had ended.); Dobbs, supra note 101, at 208-19 (summary of recent contempt 
citations for criticism ofjudicial proceedings and the resulting tension of the constitutional 
mandate in the first amendment for freedom of speech). 
121. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (1988»; see also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), stating: 
Although it is true that the Act marks the first congressional step to curtail the 
contempt powers of the federal courts, ihe important thing to note is that the area 
of curtailment related not to punishment for disobedience of court orders but to 
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This statute, as amended in 1970, continues to define the conduct 
which constitutes contempt of court. Federal Rule of Criminal Proce­
dure 42 governs the procedures for a contempt hearing. Because the 
proceedings determine the rights afforded the contemnor, a brief ex­
amination of the federal statutes is useful as these proceedings can also 
be determinative of the nature of the contempt. 
B. The Federal Statutes and Rules 
The basic statutory provision relating to contempt in the federal 
courts is 18 U.S.C. section 401, entitled "Power of Court." 122 It con­
tains substantially the same language as the Act of 1789.123 Section 
402 of Title 18 requires that contempts involving wi11fu1 disobedience 
punishment for conduct of the kind that had provoked Judge Peck's controversial 
action. 
Id. at 171; Kuhns, supra note 109, at 486 n.16; Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the 
Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83, 86-87 (1947). 
122. For a more complete discussion of the federal statutes governing contempt and 
their possible application in the context of civil contempt, see infra notes 309-15. See also 
United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Section 401 applies to both 
criminal and civil contempt and contains no limitation on the power of the district court to 
impose fine or imprisonment for a violation."). 
123. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) provides: 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison­
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as­
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, 
decree, or command. 
Id. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1988) provides: 
Any person, corporation or association willfully disobeying any lawful writ, 
process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United States 
or any court of the District of Columbia, by doing any act or thing therein, or 
thereby forbidden, if the act or thing so done be of such character as to constitute 
also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States or under any laws of 
any State in which the act was committed, shall be prosecuted for such contempt 
as provided in section 3691 of this title and shall be punished by fine or imprison­
ment, or both. 
Such fine shall be paid to the United States or to the complainant or other 
party injured by the act constituting the contempt, or may, where more than one 
is so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them as the court may direct, 
but in no case shall the fine to be paid to the United States exceed, in case the 
accused is a natural person, the sum of $1,000, nor shall such imprisonment ex­
ceed the term of six months. 
This section shall not be construed to relate to contempts committed in the 
presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of jus­
tice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process, 
order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prose­
cuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States, but the same, and all 
270 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:245 
of district court otders· which constitute a criminal offense be prose­
cuted by a jury trial. Section 402 also provides that fines may be paid 
either to the United States or to the complainant or other injured 
party.124 This section specifically excludes direct contempts. All cases 
of contempt "may be punished in conformity to the prevailing usages 
at law."12S 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42126 deals with proceedings 
to punish for criminal contempt. 127 There are two ways of proceeding 
in criminal contempt cases: the summary hearing governed by Rule 
42(a), triggered by an act committed in the presence of the judge, and 
labeled a direct contempt; and a formal plenary hearing governed by 
Rule 42(b), triggered by an act committed outside the presence of the 
judge, initiated by a notice charging the individual with contempt of 
court, and labeled an indirect contempt. 128 Although distinguishing 
other cases of contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be punished 
in conformity to the prevailing usages at law. 
[d. 
124. See also Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 170 
("Section 402 ... recognizes ... the possibility of relief to the injured party in contempt 
proceedings, and the structure of the statutes and rule ... clearly contemplates civil con­
tempt proceedings. "). 
125. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1988); see also supra note 123. 
126. In the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT 
146-50 (1943), Rule 42 was Rule 34. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) provides 
for Summary Disposition: 
(A) SUMMARY DISPOsmON. A criminal contempt may be punished summa­
rily if the judge certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the 
contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The 
order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and en­
tered of record. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) provides: 
(B) DISPOSITION UPON NOTICE AND HEARING. A criminal contempt ex­
cept as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The 
notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the 
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the crim­
inal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by 
the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the 
United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, 
by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a 
trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. The defendant is 
entitled to admission to bail as provided by these rules. If the contempt charged 
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from pre­
siding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict 
or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). 
127. But see United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980) (Although Rule 
42 is labeled criminal, procedural safeguards apply to civil contempt.). 
128. Dobbs, supra note WI, at 227-28 (The distinction between a direct contempt, 
which is dealt with on the spot by the judge who witnessed the contempt, and an indirect 
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between types of contempt on the basis of where the act occurs, the 
rule does not define the nature of the contempt. "The rule does not 
endeavor to define a criminal contempt or to distinguish it from a civil 
contempt. To do this would constitute prescribing a rule of substan­
tive law."129 Although the drafters did their best to require notice for 
criminal contempts, meaningful distinctions between civil and crimi­
nal contempt remained unclear in many cases. 
c. Criminal and Civil Contempt in the Federal Courts 
The inherent judicial power to punish for contempt includes the 
power to impose both civil and criminal penalties.l3° Judges, legisla­
contempt, which requires a full hearing, is often a difficult line to draw.); see also Note, 
supra note 105, at 374 (The direct/indirect distinction does not determine whether the 
contempt is civil or criminal.). But see Kuhns, supra note 109, at 518. 
In McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, Judge Learned Hand pointed out the diffi­
culties in distinguishing between the two types of contempts and suggested that "some 
simple and certain tests by which the character of the prosecution can be determined" 
should be promulgated. 80 F.2d 211, 214, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603 (1935). Rule 42(b) 
was in part a response to this need. Orfield, supra note 68, at 585. The requirement of 
notice in Rule 42(b) will "result in an early decision on the complicated question of the 
difference between a criminal and a civil contempt." Id. 
129. Orfield, supra note 68, at 585; see also 18 U.S.C. § 402 ("[A]lI other cases of 
contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be punished in conformity to the 
prevailing usages at law."); Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1558 n.17 (lIth Cir. 
1988) ("If the contumacy is a crime in itself, the conduct is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 402 (1982). Because the disclosure of grand jury matters does not constitute a crime in 
itself, that statute does not apply."). 
130. Kuhns, supra note 109, at 496. See generally Fink, supra note 118, at 57-70, 
where the author examines the development of contempt and the beginning of the dichot­
omy between civil and criminal contempts. The distinction was finalized for purposes of 
review in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The Court con­
cluded that criminal safeguards were required in any adjudication of a criminal contempt 
and absent such proceedings, the contempt had to be civil, allowing only civil-type penal­
ties. The Court went further and stated that: 
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often 
serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the 
punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for 
criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority ofthe court. 
Id. at 441. After Gompers, a judge was limited in using a contempt sanction: coercion 
could only be used if there was something to coerce and criminal due process had to apply 
to the adjudication of any procedure where any determinate sentence was handed down. 
The problem with the punishment classification is that it does not inform the defendant at 
the beginning of the action of the nature of the case against him. In United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258(1947), Justice Rutledge, in a biting dissent, criticized the 
confusion created by the Supreme Court's lack of clarity: 
This case is characteristic of the long existing confusion concerning con­
tempts and the manner of their trial, among other things, in that most frequently 
the question of the nature and character of the proceeding, whether civil or crimi­
nal, is determined at its end in the stage of review rather than . . . at the begin­
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tors, and commentators have been unable to give a precise definition of 
the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt that avoids ana­
lytic confusion. 131 However, there is general agreement in the federal 
courts that the purposes served by each type of contempt are different 
and that constitutional safeguards are required in any adjudication of 
a criminal contempt. 
1. Civil Contempt 
The primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce the individual 
into compliance with a court order. 132 Civil contempt benefits the 
other party in the proceeding, whose rights or remedies have been in­
terfered with by the contemnor. Possible sanctions can include fines 
and/or imprisonment that "encourage" the contemnor to cooperate 
with the court. Such imprisonment and fines can continue indefinitely 
since compliance is what the court requires from the contemnor. The 
contemnor "carr[ies] the keys of ... [his] prison in ... [his] own 
pockets,"133 indicating that a strong-willed perSon could be impris­
oned indefinitely for civil contempt. 134 Civil contempts are initiated 
by the offended party who petitions the court for relief. Civil con­
tempt has been praised as the least drastic power to compel obedience 
to a court order; however, this underestimates the sometimes drastic 
results to an individual held in civil contempt. 13S 
2. Criminal Contempt 
The primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish the con­
temnor for disobedience. The conduct consists of violating a court 
ning. And this fact in itself illustrates the complete jeopardy in which rights are 
placed when the nature of the proceeding remains unknown and unascertainable 
until the final action on review. 
Id. at 368 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
131. Kuhns, supra note 109, stating: 
Prior to the adoption of rule 42, courts tended to classify contempts as civil 
or criminal according to such factors as the title of the proceeding, whether the 
defendant testified, the nature of the relief sought or granted, and who conducted 
the prosecution. The controlling factor would vary from case to case, and the 
labeling might occur for the first time on appeal . . . . 
Id. at 517-18 (footnotes omitted). 
132. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. 
133. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). 
134. Brautigam, supra note 115, at 1523 n.61. 
135. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 115, at 2-3 ("[I]t has been pointed out that the mag­
nitude ofthe coercive penalty in civil contempts is measured by the resistance to be over­
come rather than the gravity of what has been done. Though all societies punish people for 
what they have done, only the common law punishes man 'in order to do violence to his 
incoercible freedom to do or not to do something.' "). 
273 1990] FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e) 
order or interfering with the orderly process of the court. 136 Criminal 
contempt is not imposed for any private party's benefit because it is 
imposed to vindicate the court's authority. It punishes acts in the past 
rather that coerces any future act. "[I]f the defendant does that which 
he has been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accom­
plished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done 
nor afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the 
disobedience."137 Sanctions for criminal contempt are always punitive 
and often confined within statutory limitations. 
A recent Supreme Court case has attempted to clarify the distinc­
tion. In Hicks ex rei. Feiock v. Feiock,138 the Supreme Court held that 
the issue of whether the contempt proceeding and the subsequent relief 
were civil or criminal raised a federal question under the Due Process 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment because of the applicability of 
constitutional protections in a criminal proceeding. The critical fea­
tures which characterize one or the other contempt are "the substance 
of the proceeding and the character of the relief that the proceeding 
will afford."139 The purposes for which the relief is imposed "are 
properly drawn from an examination of the character of the relief it­
self."I40 Remedial relief imposed for an indefinite period of time is 
civil and punitive relief which imposes a determinate sentence is crimi­
nal. "These distinctions lead up to the fundamental proposition that 
criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been 
afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such crimi­
136. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. 
137. Id. 
138. 485 U.S. 624 (1988). In Feiock, a father was compelled by a California state 
court to make support payments. Id. at 627. Upon his failure to pay, he was held in· 
contempt of court, ordered to pay the support, spend 25 days in jail, and be on probation 
for three years upon suspension of sentence. Id. at 628. The Court remanded the decision 
for a determination of whether the contempt proceedings were civil or criminal, because 
such a determination would be dispositive on the question of the validity of the presump­
tion that an obligated parent is required to make support payments. Id. at 637-41. In a 
criminal proceeding the presumption would violate due process, whereas in a civil proceed­
ing the presumption would be constitutionally valid. The problem with the contempt sen­
tence in Feiock was the uncertainty about the 25 days imprisonment. If the contemnor 
violated the probation by not paying the support and consequently went to prison to serve 
the 25 days, it is unclear if the sentence could be purged by paying the money during the 25 
days, thus being released early. If that were the case, the contempt would be civil. If the 
contemnor's violation during the probationary period resulted in 25 days imprisonment 
regardless of payment during that time, the contempt would be criminal. Id. at 639-41. 
139. Id. at 631; cf Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441 ("It is not the fact of punishment but 
rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of 
cases.") (emphasis added). 
140. Feiock, 485 U.S. at 636. 
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nal proceedings . . . . The Court has consistently applied these 
principles."141 
The Court in Feiock reiterated its view that the distinction be­
tween civil and criminal contempt is an important one because it· de- . 
termines what procedure governs the adjudication of the contempt. 
"The United States Supreme Court has centered on the procedural 
consequences of a criminal contempt citation; it has not directly con­
cerned itself with a clarification of the differences between civil and 
criminal contempt."142 The Supreme Court has recommended look­
ing at what "the court primarily seek[s] to accomplish" as the best 
approach. 143 If the goal is to benefit the other party to the action by 
some act that the contemnor refuses to do, then the contempt is civil; 
if the court wants to punish the contemnor for refusing to cooperate 
with the court or for interfering with court procedures, then the con­
tempt is criminal. However, in Feiock, the Court appeared to reject 
the purposes distinction as dispositive. Although noting that "[t]he 
proper classification of the relief imposed . . . is dispositive of this 
case,"I44 the Court also pointed out that the purposes underlying the 
proceeding were ambiguous. 14s 
In the absence of ariy more explicit guidelines, courts have strug­
gled with classifications and definitions of contempt to establish proce­
dures and punishments for the various types of contempt. Since the 
purpose of the proceeding is open to differing interpretations, and can 
be ambiguous, as in Feiock, there exists confusion about what type of 
contempt has been applied or should have been applied in a given situ­
ation. 146 It would seem logical that the classification of the contempt 
would also classify the conduct, but the procedures followed, the relief 
granted, or the sentence imposed usually determines the nature of the 
contempt. 147 The court's characterization of the contempt "is but one 
factor to consider in determining the true character of contempt pro­
ceedings."148 However, the way the court views the contempt deter­
141. Id. at 632. " 
142. Comment, supra note 113, at 1121. 
143. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 
144. Feiock, 485 U.S. at 637. 
145. Id. at 638-39 ("[T]he proceeding may have been intended primarily to vindicate 
the court's authority in the face of his defiance. On the other hand ... these charges were 
part of an ongoing battle to force respondent to conform his conduct to the terms of those 
orders, and of future orders as well."). 
146. Comment, supra note 113, at 1119; see, e.g., McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 
61,64 (1939); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911); Bessette 
v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328 (1904). 
147. Dobbs, supra note 101, at 236; Martineau, supra note 107, at 681. 
148. United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 626 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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mines how the contempt is adjudicated and affects the contemnor's 
rights throughout the proceedings. The importance of this last point 
underscores the need for an early, accurate, and consistent determina­
tion of the nature of the contempt. 
To determine what type of contempt is being contemplated, the 
reason -for its imposition must be determined. 149 This method of de­
termining whether civil or criminal contempt is appropriate appears to 
be backwards since the focus is not the conduct itself but the resulting 
punishment. The contemnor can be "punished" before any determina­
tion has been made of whether the contempt is criminal or civil. "To 
state an act constitutes criminal contempt because criminal sanctions 
are applied merely completes a tautology. This approach provides no 
aid to analysis."lso If the type of contempt depends on the type of 
sanction, the type of contempt cannot be determined until the conclu­
sion of the proceeding and the procedure cannot be tailored to the type 
of contempt, as yet undetermined. lSI A punitive sanction can only be 
imposed after a proceeding meeting the constitutional safeguards nec­
essary to a criminal proceeding. "Notwithstanding this principle, no 
judicial opinion or statute has ever required the judge at the initiation 
of contempt proceedings to determine the type of sanction that may be 
imposed."IS2 
Examining briefly the civil and criminal distinction outside the 
area of contempt may help clarify the differences as they relate to the 
constitutional requirements of the proceedings. ls3 "Parties to a civil 
suit litigate in positions of reasonable equality. A criminal defendant, 
on the other hand, stands against the prosecutorial powers of the gov­
ernment and therefore criminal due process grants the defendant addi­
tional protection to safeguard the balance of powers between the 
149. Note, supra note lOS, at 375. 

ISO. Comment, supra note 113, at 1120. 

151. See supra note 130. 
152. Martineau, supra note 107, at 684. 
153. See Moskovitz, Contempt 0/ Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 780 (1943), stating: 
[O]ne of the pervading principles of Anglo-American law is that a private plaintiff 
may generally obtain only compensatory relief, while punishment is to be im­
posed at the suit of the state. Thus, it is proper that civil or remedial contempt 
proceedings be brought by private parties, while criminal or punitive proceedings 
are to be brought by the state. The value of making the character of the party 
plaintiff a test of the nature of the proceeding is enhanced by the fact that its 
application is exceptionally easy, and also because it is available at the very begin­
ning of litigation. 
Id. at 787. 
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parties." I S4 Traditionally contempt was viewed as sui generis I ss so 
traditional concepts of criminal adjudication did not apply. Today, 
however, in adjudication ofcriminal contempt, traditional due process 
applies to the proceedings. 
3. Importance of the Distinction 
The most important reason for determining whether a contempt 
is criminal or civil is the fact that Constitutional procedural safeguards 
are available to the contemnor in a criminal contempt. A contemnor 
in a proceeding for criminal contempt is innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The contemnor has a right to call.wit­
nesses and be able to prepare a defense. Additionally, he has the right 
to a trial by jury if the ,sentence imposed can be longer than six 
months.ls6 The imposition of a criminal contempt sanction (determi­
nate sentence) after a civil proceeding will result in reversal on ap­
peal. IS7 A civil proceeding does not require such elaborate due 
process because the contemnor can cooperate at any time and the pun­
ishment will cease. IS8 
One of the secondary reasons for makin~ the distinction between 
154. Comment, supra note 113, at 1120 (footnotes omitted). 
155. Moskovitz, supra note 153, at 783 ("Proceedings for contempt of court are sui 
generis. The label has'no value, save as a caveat. It warns us that precedents from other 
fields of law will not solve the problems in this one, but the term does not itself furnish any 
solutions." (footnote omitted)). 
156. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). 
157. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 
Div. 689, 531 F.2d 617, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 
125 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Brautigam, supra note 115, at 1535 n.155 ("The, high number 
of reversals or reductions of sentences in contempt cases only confirms the view that justice 
would be better served if imposition of punishment were less frequent."). 
158. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 115, stating: 
[A] different door is opened to a different legal arena and a new association of 
participating procedures and characteristics. These classifications go to the heart 
of an accused contemnor's liberty .... One turn, one move of position causes a 
swirl of new and special legal relationships between government and the individ­
ual. This aspect of the law of contempt is as reasonable as Russian roulette. 
Often also the results are tragic. 
To shrug this off as an unimportant procedural matter is to overlook the 
crucial point. Because each determination of the classification of a contempt a 
fortiori defines the treatment of the contemnor which will follow .... [C)riminal 
contempts are pardonable, civil contempts are not; civil contempts allow for pun­
ishment which could conceivably continue without end, while criminal contempts 
have vaguely limited punishments; the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
criminal Statute of Limitations apply. to criminal but not civil contempts; the bur­
den of proving the offense is greater for criminal than for civil contempts; the civil 
contempt sentence can be purged while an adjudication of criminal contempt is 
fixed and final .... These are but a few of the more glaring examples, which 
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criminal and civil contempt is the right of appeaL' 'Civil contempt is 
considered interlocutory since it involves the original cause of action 
and cannot be' appealed until there is a final judgment. A criminal 
contempt proceeding is a separate cause of action with a final decree, 
independent of the suit prompting the action, and is immediately 
appealable. 1s9 
4. Blurring of the Dist4tctions 
There exists considerable confusion about the boundaries of civil 
and criminal contempt because certain conduct arguably constitutes 
both civil and criminal contempt. The laws govenling contempt have 
failed to clarify the distinctions and the labels used are not controlling 
because "the " 'civil' and 'criminal' labels of the law have become in­
creasingly blurred."I60 
The Feiock court recognized that "both civil and criminal relief 
have aspects that can be seen as either remedial or punitive or both: 
when a court imposes fines and punishments on a cOntemnor, it is not 
only vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial court order, but 
it also is seeking to give effect to the law's purpose of modifying the 
contemnor's behavior to conform to the terms required in the or­
der."161 "Dleoretically, a criminal sentence satisfies the court's need to 
maintain respect for its processes, while coercing compliance with its 
decrees benefits other parties to the litigation. 162 A single proceeding 
can accomplish both as long as constitutional safeguards are respected. 
"[T]here is no theoretical barrier to the use of both civil and criminal 
contempt powers simultaneously, though procedural demands may 
put practical limits on such an operation."163 
In Shillitani v. United States,l64 where a witness refused to testify 
before a grand jury, the Supreme Court stated by way of dictum that 
the "trial judge [must] first consider the feasibility of coercing testi­
mony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge should re-
underscore the perceptive Holmesian comment that the substance of the law is 
secreted in the interstices of procedure. 
Id. at 48-49 (footnote omitted). 
159. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 171-72. 
160. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988). 
161. Id. at 635. 
162. Dobbs, supra note WI, at 237. 
163.. Id. at 237-38; see also United States v. Monteleone, 804·F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 
1986) (The defendant refused to answer questions ~fore a grand jury and was held in civil 
contempt. He was subsequently convicted of criminal contempt for the same refusal.), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987). 
164. 384 U.S. 364 (1966). 
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sort to criminal sanctions only after he determines, for good reason, 
that the civil remedy would be inappropriate." 165 InShillitani, the 
Court concluded that the contempt was civil because the contemnors 
were jailed until they agreed to go before the grand jury and testify. 
The Court found that the sanctions were remedial.· "Courts often 
speak in terms of criminal contempt and punishment fOl: remedial pur­
poses."166 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
expressed similar frustration in 1966: 
The simple fact is that no one, simply no one, is able to determine 
whether this was begun, tried, or ended as a case for criminal con­
tempt, civil contempt, or both, or whether some place down the 
trail, begun as one it was transmuted into the other. That is, of 
course, one thing about which there may not be any doubt if a con- . 
tempt order is to stand. 167 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Wendy,168 found that any contempt was improper, but 
as imposed by the district court it was predgminantly civil, although 
"[a]rguably, appellant was really cited for criminal contempt."169 The 
defendant, an attorney, was held in contempt and fined five hundred 
dollars per day by the judge for refusing to proceed with a trial as 
ordered. The appellate court found that the appellant's ina~ility to 
proceed with the criminal trial because the appellant was a tax attor­
ney rather than a criminal attorney was a recognized defense to civil 
contempt and, as such, was dispo.sitive of the classification because the 
appellant was "obviously unqualified"170 to do what was being or­
dered. His inability to do what was ordered militated against any con­
tempt citation under the circumstances. 171 
The appellate court in Wendy held that there was no viola~ion of 
18 U.S.c. section 401, which governs criminal contempt. 'However, 
the contemnor was unable to purge his contempt, a determining factor 
in civil contempt. "The civil nature of the contempt is not turned 
criminal by the court's efforts at vindicating its authority, an interest 
which may be implicated in either civil or criminal proceedings. Thus, 
165. Id. at 371 n.9. 
166. Id. at 369. 
167. Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1966). 
168. 575 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1978). 
169. Id. at 1029 n.13. 
170. Id. at 1031. 
17 L The court was sensitive to the consequences to an attorney of being cited for 
contempt, either criminal or civil. "The appellation of 'civil' rather than 'criminal' con­
tempt hardly alleviates the harm." Id. at 1030. 
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we are giving principal weight to the punitive-remedial dichotomy."172 
There is a presumption of finding civil as opposed to criminal con­
tempt when there is some doubt about the contempt. 173 The Wendy 
court looked at the contempt order and the defendant's response to 
determine whether the contempt was civil or criminal. 
The authority of the jUdiciary to punish for contempt is not ques­
tioned under the courts' inherent supervisory power. Although guided 
by the Executive branch, the judiciary enforces the orders of the grand 
jury under statutory and due process limitations. However, even with 
statutory authority, the judiciary must still make the initial and final 
determinations of whether certain conduct is better dealt with under a 
civil or criminal contempt. Clarity about the nature of the contempt 
and the statutory basis of the proceeding simplifies the appellate pro­
cess when contempt orders are challenged. In the absence of such 
early judicial clarification, contempt proceedings can prejudice the 
contemnor. 
D. Judicial Control of the Grand Jury 
The grand jury is organized by the court and its proceedings are 
determined by statute. 174 The grand jurors, the United States Attor­
ney, his or her assistants, the reporter of the grand jury proceedings, 
the marshal and the bailiffs are considered officers of the court subject 
to the control of the court for violations of their duties. 175 Although 
grand juries do not operate independently of the court, courts should 
not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason.176 
In addition to sanctions for breaches of grand jury secrecy, courts 
have the power to hold witnesses in contempt for a refusal to testify 
and to purge the individual of contempt when the dignity of the court 
has 'been restored. 177 The Supreme Court observed that "[a] grand 
jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains 
an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative func­
172. Id. at 1029 n.13. 
173. Id. 
174. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. 
175. Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343,439 (1959). 
176. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973); United States v. De Rosa, 
783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.) (The prosecutor may not interfere with the unbiased judg­
ment of the grand jury.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); see also Lance v. United States 
Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Moreover, because the grand jury 
process is now complete for Lance's case, there is no chance that any remedial relief 
granted could interfere with the grand jury's work."). 
177. In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 573 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
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tion without the cOurt's aid."178 Consequently, courts use their inher­
ent power of cont~mpt, a power necessary "to the preservation of 
order in judicial proceedings," 179 including the work of the grand jury. 
Grand juries possess enormous power because of the "difficulty 
and importance of·.their task,"180 and their powers ought to be super­
vised and limited to the extent necessary to guarantee fairness. Be­
cause secrecy is one basic ~ayto limit abuse of this power, inadvertent 
or illegal breach of secrecy should be monitored by the court. Since 
1977, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) has expressly provided 
for punishment by ,contempt for violations of grand jury secrecy. Ac­
cordingly, the federal courts have cited the express provision of con­
tempt and other remedial sanctions to safeguard the necessary secrecy 
of the proceedings: of the federal grand jury. 
178. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959). This case involved a witness 
who refused to testify before a grand jury. Id. at 42. The initial refusal was not a contempt 
of court. However, once the grand jury requested the judge's help to order the petitioner to 
answer and he subsequently refused, he was guilty of a contempt. Id. at 42-43. At this 
point Rule 42(b) would have been appropriate because the contempt was indirect. The 
court ordered the petitioner to answer the questions in front of the judge who was then in 
the grand jury room. The petitioner refused again and was summarily sentenced to fifteen 
months imprisonment, imder Rule 42(a), for directly violating a court order. Id. at 44. 
The Supreme Court upheld the sentence and the summary nature of the proceeding. Id. at 
52. In his dissent, Chief Justice Warren remarked that principles offair play and the intent 
of Rule 42 were violat~ by such a harsh summary punishment. Chief Justie;e Warren 
stated tha~ Rule 42(a) was reserve<I for exceptional circumstances, not for the administra­
tive' purpOse of maldng contempts easier to prosecute. This was the longest sentence ever 
sustained on appeal for a refusal to answer questions before a grand jury. Id. at 58-59 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
179. Ex parte Terry, 128.U.S. 289, 303 (1888) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 
(19 Wall.) 50S, 510 (1873». See infra notes 336-49 and accompanying text for a more 
detailed discussion of the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts. 
180. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 434 (1983); see also' In re'Grand 
Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1985), which stated: ~ 
The grand jury is, to a degree, an entity independent of the courts, and both 
the authority and the obligation of the courts to control its processes are limited. 
Frequent or undue court intervention in the proceedings of a grand jury would 
Impede its authority and make it a less efficacious instrument for the administra­
tion of the criminal laws. The need to preserve the secrecy of an ongoing grand 
jury investigation is of paramount importance, and the judiciary must respect the 
autonomy of the grand jury proceedings in this regard. . . . 
The rule of judicial noninterference with grand jury proceedings is not abso­
lute. A court may exercise supervisory authority over the grand jury proceedings 
if there is a clear basis in law and fact for so doing .... Courts may also exercise 
supervisory power,over the grand jury where there is a clear potential for a viola­
tion of the rights either of a witness or of a non witness, if the violation Cannot be 
corrected at a later stage. 
Id. at 864 (citations omitted). 
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IV. CASES INVOLVING RULE 6(e) VIOLATIONS 
Prior to 1977, federal courts used their inherent supervisory pow­
ers to sanction individuals who violated the secrecy provisions of Rule 
6(e). Many of the cases involved motions by defendants to dismiss 
indictments or quash subpoenas. Rarely did the' defendant request 
sanctions in the form of contempt of court, although the courts regu­
larly recognized contempt as an appropriate remedy for violations of 
Rule 6(e). After the adoption of the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) 
expressly authorizing contempt, the federal courts have continued to 
recognize the appropriateness of contempt and other remedies such as 
suppression of testimony, dismissal of indictments and convictions, 
and quashing of subpoenas. The following sections divide the cases of 
Rule 6(e) violations chronologically into the cases before the 1977 
amendments and the cases after the adoption of the express contempt 
provision, with particular emphasis on Lance v. United States Depart­
ment ofJustice,l8l which established standards for determining what is 
sufficient for a prima facie showing of a Rule 6( e) violation. 
A. Cases Prior to 1977 
Many of the cases prior to the 1977 amendments reveal a reluc­
tance on the part of the courts to remedy prosecutorial abuse of the 
grand jury. Secrecy has largely shielded the actions of the prosecutor, 
who exercises substantial control over the grandjury.1B2 However, the 
early cases do underscore the jUdiciary;s respect for grand jury secrecy 
in general, and its willingness to impose sanctions on violators other 
than government attorneys. 
In re Summerhayes,183 decided in 1895 by the District Court of 
the Northern District of California, involved disclosures by a grand 
juror, who violated the oath of secrecy. The court proceeded under 
section 725 of the Revised Statutes that allowed courts to use their 
authority to prevent obstruction of justice. l84 The district court's 
opinion, holding the grand juror in contempt of court, illustrated the 
importance with which the courts treated such violations of their or­
ders and inattention to the secrecy oath. "I think it is a serious of­
181. 610 F.2d 202, 216-20 (5th Cir. 1980). 
182. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. 
183. 70 F. 769 (N.D. Cal. 1895); see also Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 
(9th Cir. 1939) (A grand jury witness refused to take the oath of secrecy and was punisbed 
with a thirty-day determinate sentence of imprisonment. There was no discussion of coer­
cion and subsequent purging by the punisbment which would have implicated a civil 
sanction.). 
184. 70 F. at 773. 
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fense. I think it is one of the gravest offenses that has been committed 
in this district against the regular and proper administration of the 
law. The respondent must be punished, and I think he ought to be 
punished severely."lss Consistent with the traditional purposes of 
criminal contempt, the criminal contempt in Summerhayes was im­
posed to vindicate the court's authority. 
In Schmidt v. United States,186 the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court 
and remanded the case before another judge to ensure fairness1s7 and 
to determine whether the conduct of the appellants was merely techni­
cal contempt or involved willful and intentional disrespect· of the 
court. ISS The appellants were attorneys who had advised their clients 
that they had the right to question grand jurors about the indictment 
that had been returned against them. The district court found that, 
although claiming to act in good faith, such conduct was an obstruc­
tion of justice and, therefore, the attorneys were guilty of criminal . 
contempt. 189 
The court stated the traditional rules for secrecy of the grand jury 
and indicated that only one of these reasons was to protect the inno­
cent against unjust accusations. l90 The other reasons of promoting 
freedom of the investigation and untrammeled disclosures, and 
185. Id. at 775. 
186. 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940). 
187. Id. at 398; cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) ("If the contempt charged involves disre­
spect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or 
hearing except with the defendant's consent."). 
188. liS F.2d at 398. This case involved a petition against alleged contemnors to 
show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for violations of grand jury 
secrecy. After being judged guilty of contempt, they appealed their convictions. The ap­
pellate court viewed the contemnors conduct as an "unlawful interference with ,the pro­
ceedings of the court," but stated that their actions may only have involved a teChniCal 
contempt. Id. at 396. On remand, the court sought a distinction between a technical con­
tempt and a contempt involving willful and intentional disrespect for the court. ,"Such 
decision is required as a prerequisite to a proper determination of the penalty to be im­
posed." Id. at 398.. 
In Schmidt, the court found the punishment for contempt necessary to vindicate the 
court's authority, a purpose consistent with a finding of criminal contempt. However, the 
court's remand to determine the contemnor's state of mind appeared to necessitate further 
inquiry into a finding of criminal contempt or civil contempt. Nonetheless, the facts did 
not support the usefulness of a coercive sanction. Perhaps the reference to a technical 
contempt was to mitigate the harshness of any punishment for the contempt, rather than to 
clarify the underlying purpose or nature of the contempt. The current language of Rule 
6(e) requires a "knowing" violation which would seem to negate any contempt where the 
alleged contemnor acted in good faith consistent with past practices and cases . .See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
189. Id. at 396. 
190. Id. at 396-97. 
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preventing perjury and flight of the target, were for the protection of 
the grand jury itself which is a representative of the public. The court 
did mention that protecting the innocent was traditionally respected, 
but implied that the other reasons, which protect the grand jury itself 
as an independent representative of the people, are more important. 
The court reiterated the view that private attorneys do not decide 
when secrecy can be relaxed, because "[l]ogically, the responsibility 
for relaxing .the rule of secrecy and of supervising any subsequent in­
quiry should reside in the court ...."191 
In United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 192 the District Court 
for Rhode Island denied the newspaper's motion to dismiss an infor­
mation charging it with contempt of court for publishing the names of 
four prominent doctors testifying before a grand jury which was inves­
tigating illegal cocaine traffic. The court found that conspicuous pub­
lication of the identity of witnesses frustrated the purposes of s~recy: 
Publicity may defeat justice by warning offenders to escape, to de­
stroy evidence, or to tamper with witnesses .... 
. . . Even when it does not lead to the flight of an offender, it 
may result . . . in a failure of the grand jury to secure evidence 
sufficient for an indictment. 
Secrecy is also required in order that the reputations of inno­
cent persons may not suffer from the fact that their conduct is under 
investigation .... 
. . . Furthermore, such premature reports may go further and 
prejudice the mind of the public, thus affecting a trial which may 
follow the action of the grand jury. 193 
The newspaper gave no account of matters occurring before the 
grand jury. It merely observed who entered the grand jury room and 
published enough facts in the newspaper for the reading public to 
draw accurate inferences. The court found that even though not 
sworn to secrecy, the newspaper, as any citizen, had the duty to "as­
sist, and not to frustrate, the work of the administration of justice."194 
These early cases illustrate the importance with which the judici­
ary viewed grand jury secrecy, and the willingness of the jUdiciary to 
191. Id. at 397. 
192. 241 F. 524 (D.R.1. 1917); see also United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 
302-09 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (The court addressed the role of the grand jury and the press, 
finding that unauthorized disclosure by government attorneys was reprehensible, but not 
prejudicial.). 
193. 241 F. at 526. 
194. See id. at 528. 
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exert control by use of the contempt power when breaches of secrecy 
occurred. However, the reasoning fails to illuminate the need or the 
efficacy of remedies against government attorneys involved in breaches 
of secrecy. All of these cases contemplated criminal contempt against 
jurors, defense attorneys, and newspapers involved in "leaking" infor­
mation to the public. None of the cases compelled the court to discuss 
sanctions against government attorneys for secrecy violations. 
Although the facts in the Tribune case were somewhat similar to mod­
em cases of "leaks" to the newspaper, the reasoning which found a 
citizen's duty not to frustrate justice may fail when applied to the gov­
ernment. Arguably, the contempt in the Schmidt case could be con­
strued as civil because the judge found no willful state of mind. Such 
reasoning opens up the possibility of civil as well as criminal contempt. 
However, further analysis would show that in this factual situation, 
vindication of the court's authority would be the only purpose served 
by the imposition of any contempt. 
Many of the more recent pre-1977 cases involved a motion by the 
defendant to dismiss the indictment, not a motion to seek sanctions 
against the government officials allegedly violating Rule 6(e)'s secrecy 
provision. 195 In In re the Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Pedro 
Archuleta,196 the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
refused the requested relief of quashing the subpoena,197 upon grounds 
of lack of good faith in calling the defendant as a witness, illegal wire­
195. See United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., 475 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir.) 
(The court refused to set aside convictions based on alleged grand jury violations, including 
violations of Rule 6(e). However, the court pointed out that the appropriate remedy would 
be a contempt citation to stop grand jury abuse and protect secrecy.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
832 (1973); United States v. Kearney, 436 F. Supp. 1108, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("More­
over, it would appear that the appropriate remedy for improper disclosure of grand jury 
evidence is contempt and not dismissal of the indictment."); United States v. Mitchell, 372 
F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (Each of the defendants sought dismissal of the indictment because of preindict­
ment publicity in contravention of Rule 6(e). In each case, the district court found no 
grounds to warrant an evidentiary hearing and also did not discuss the use of lesser sanc­
tions than the drastic step of dismissing an indictment.); United States v. Archer, 355 F. 
Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) (proving that preindictment pUblicity prejudiced the 
grand jury is probably unmanageable); United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963). 
196. 432 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. N.Y.), reconsidered on subsequent motion, 434 F. Supp. 
325 (S.D.N.Y.1977). In a subsequent case, In re the Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon 
Pedro Archuleta, 561 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1977), Archuleta was found guilty of civil con­
tempt for refusing to answer questions put to him before the grand jury. 
197. See also United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). The court 
quashed the subpoena and strongly condemned the practice of releasing prejudicial infor­
285 1990] FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e) 
tapping, ethnic composition of the grand jury, and illegal disclosure of 
grand jury information to the New York Times. The district court 
acknowledged the harm to defendant's reputation and standing in the 
community,198 and suggested that the proper remedy was the imposi­
tion of sanctions upon the offending party.199 
In Archuleta, the grand jury was investigating allegations of in­
volvement in a New York City bombing incident. Archuleta was al­
legedly a supplier of dynamite to a Puerto Rican independence group. 
The court did not think it sufficient to rest on "mere exhortations and 
condemnatory words: 'the mere gnashing of judicial teeth should not 
remain the sole response to such law enforcement behavior.' "200 The 
court recognized that leaks from the government were "a betrayal of 
the grand jury's historic role as a shield for innocent citizens from 
unwarranted charges of wrongdoing. "201 The court was unable to de­
termine the identity of the source of the leaks to the press,2°2 however, 
the district court directed the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York to conduct an internal investigation and report 
back to the court within thirty days. 203 The district court assumed 
that the Department of Justice would investigate the disclosures. No 
sanctions were ever imposed. 204 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
mation about a grand jury witness, holding that such violations of Rule 6(e) would not be 
tolerated: 
Visiting opprobrium on persons by officially charging them with crimes while 
denying them a forum to vindicate their names, undertaken as extra-judicial pun­
ishment or to chill their expressions and associations, is not a governmental inter­
est that we can accept or consider. It would circumvent the adversary process 
which is at the heart of our criminal justice system and of the relation between 
government and citizen under our constitutional system. It would be intolerable 
to·our society. 
Id. at 806 (footnote omitted). 
198. 432 F. Supp. at 598. 
199. Id. at 599. 
200. Id. (quoting United States v. Capra, 372 F. Supp. 609, 615 (1974». 
201. Id. at 598. 
202. Id. at 599 ("[11he government is not in a position to deny that some of that 
information may have come from federal sources somewhere in the United States."). . 
203. Id. 
204. 561 F.2d 1059, 1063 n.8; cf United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d eir. 
1972) (An indictment was dismissed because the prosecutor failed to heed warnings against 
using hearsay before the grand jury.). Although Estepa was not a case where Rule 6(e) was 
implicated, it does demonstrate the court's willingness prior to 1977 to use supervisory 
. powers to ensure the fairness of the grand jury system. The court's acknowledgment that 
injunctive relief in the form of requesting that the prosecutor cease his use of hearsay was 
ineffective. The court did not use contempt sanctions to ensure the fairness, but dismissed 
the indictment, an extreme sanction. 
I 

286 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:245 
Circuit upheld the conviction for civil contempt for Archuleta's re­
fusal to answer questions before the grand jury because the "govern­
ment has supplied affidavits denying that any breach of grand jury 
secrecy was the basis for any of the articles mentioned."20s The court 
stated that "[i]f such violations do occur, the district court has ade­
quate powers to remedy the situation. "206 
The attitudes expressed by the appellate court in Archuleta under­
score the need for more careful analysis of the problem of what is 
necessary for a prima facie showing of a grand jury secrecy violation. 
Such clarity may have been useful to Archuleta considering that the 
court found affidavits merely denying breaches of secrecy sufficient to 
deny any relief. Although the district court attempted to remedy the 
abuse, its efforts were ineffectual. Given the reluctance to dismiss in­
dictments and the willingness to hold nongovernment violators of 
grand jury secrecy in criminal contempt, the adoption of the express 
sanction may have influenced the courts to examine the government's 
conduct. An examination of the cases after the 1977 amendment will 
assist in any determination of whether the Judiciary has become more 
willing to use its express grant of authority to sanction the government 
attorneys for breaches of secrecy. 
B. Cases After the 1977 Amendments to Rule 6(e) 
Contempt of court has been more readily acknowledged207 as the 
205. 561 F.2d at 1064. 
206. Id. 
207. See, e.g., United States v. Malatesta, 5i13 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In the 
usual case Rule 6(e) may be adequately enforced by a contempt citation ...."); United 
States v. Kouba, 632 1". Supp. 937 (D.N.D. 1986) (The court found that the defendant's 
claim of violations of Rule 6(e) lacked substance and that dismissal of the indictment was 
not warranted absent a showing of prejudice because the rule provided for sanctions.). In 
United States v. Barker, 623 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1985), six defendants were charged 
with violations of federal narcotic laws. The motion to dismiss the indictment, subse­
quently denied, was based on an allegation of breach of grand jury secrecy. The court's 
holding that there was no violation of the rule turned on the definition of "government 
personnel" within the meaning of the rule. Dismissal of the indictment is only warranted 
where there is "a showing that there was such an abuse of the grand jury process that any 
substantial rights of the defendant were impaired or the integrity of the grand jury proceed­
ings was impugned." Id. at 840 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1044 (5th 
Cir. 1981». In the absence of any such showing the rule is enforced by sanctions specifi­
cally provided in the Rule. In Donovan v. Smith, 552 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the 
defendants alleged that the charges of breaches of fiduciary duty under the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act were the product of a violation of grand jury secrecy. To 
prove the allegation, the defendants had deposed various people employed in the United 
States Department of Labor and the United 'States Department of Justice Strike Force. 
The government moved for a protective order to prevent the deposition of the lead attorney 
in the Labor Department. The attorney had already testified in camera and the court was 
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appropriate sanction for violations of grand jury secrecy since its in­
clusion in Rule 6(e). Most courts, however, do not see it as the exclu­
sive remedy for violations of grand jury secrecy and recognize not only 
criminal contempt and civil contempt, but also injunctive relief,208 
when considering whether the exercise of supervisory power is war­
ranted for breaches of secrecy in grand jury proceedings. 
, In United States v. Myers,209 the District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York refused to dismiss indictments, holding that dis­
missal was an inappropriate sanction for violations of Rule 6(e).210 
The targets alleged leaks to the news media concerning their alleged 
involvement in the Abscam investigations by the grand jury. The 
court acknowledged that the government's conduct was grossly im­
proper, and possibly illegal, and that it could properly exercise its su­
pervisory power to deter prosecutorial misconduct. However, the 
court found that "this authority must be invoked with extreme caution 
and in the exceptional case."211 The court found its supervisory power 
limited "to achieve one or both of two objectives: first, to eliminate 
prejudice to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; second, to help to 
satisfied from this testimony that no breach of secrecy had occurred. The court stated that 
contempt or a motion to suppress was an appropriate remedy. In United States v. Gregory, 
508 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Ala. 1980), the judge refused to recuse himself after tendering a 
financial disclosure statement and remarking to the defense counsel, "I hope you choke on 
it." Id. at 1219. In support of the request for recusal, the defendants had accused the judge 
of ignoring contemptuous behavior of tl).e government prosecutor. The judge stated that 
the defendant must initiate a motion for contempt in any allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
208. See. e.g., United States v. DiBona, 601 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1984). In 
DiBona, injunctive relief was granted where the defendants had entered guilty pleas in a 
criminal action for filing false statements with the United States government. In the subse­
quent civil action for filing false claims for payment of defense contracts for work that was 
not performed, the defendants alleged that the government used grand jury material in 
contravention of Rule 6(e). The court found no violation of Rule 6(e), however, it issued 
an order enjoining the government from any further use of the material. 
209. 510 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
210. See United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988) (The government 
repeatedly violated Rule 6(e); however, such problems cannot result in dismissal of an in­
dictment after convjction absent any effect on the outcome at trial.). In Bank of Nova 
Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a district court 
may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings absent prejudice to the 
defendants. However, Justice Marshall in dissent stated that: 
Because of the strict protection of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, instances 
of prosecutorial misconduct rarely come to light .... The fact that a prosecutor 
knows that a Rule 6 violation is unlikely to be discovered gives the Rule little 
enough bite .... Today's decision reduces/Rule 6 to little more than a code of 
honor that prosecutors can violate with virtual impunity. 
Id. at 264-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
211. 510 F. Supp. at 328. 
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translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys into consistent 
performances by their assistants."212 The court listed other lesser 
sanctions to det~r future misconduct of government attorneys, includ­
ing the contempt sanctions of Rule 6(e).213 The court found such rem­
edies sufficient to deter future misconduct and noted that supervisory 
powers needed to be exercised with restraint.214 
The contempt sanction in Rule 6(e) is not considered the exclu­
sive remedy for violations of grand jury secrecy. 21 S In United States v. 
Coughlan,216 the defendant claimed that a civil complaint which at­
tached four pages from defendant's grand jury testimony in a criminal 
indictment violated Rule 6(e). The defendant wanted to suppress the 
testimony from the criminal indictment. 
Although the government admitted the violations of Rule 6(e), it 
contended that sanctions for contempt were the appropriate remedy, 
not suppression of the evidence. The court stated that the language in 
212. Id. (quoting United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 1978), cerL 
denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979». 
213. Id. Although using the word "guilty" in describing the potential contemnor, 
the court cited Lance v. United States Department of Justice, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980), 
as authority for the use of Rule 6(e), which applied civil sanctions. See infra notes 224-41 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lance case. See also United States v. Ander­
son, 778 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1985), where the court refused to use the "drastic action" of 
dismissal for alleged violations of Rule 6(e). The court did not mention other lesser sanc­
tions, but implied that dismissal was not the usual way to proceed when' prosecutorial 
misconduct is found under Rule 6(e). "Reported cases where an appellate court has upheld 
a district court's dismissal of an indictment because of alleged prosecutorial misconduct are 
few and far between." Id. at 606. In In re Harrisburg Grand Jury-83-2, 638 F. Supp. 43 
(M.D. Pa. 1986), the Department of Justice asked for a prospective determination of 
whether certain conduct that complied with a subpoena duces tecum would violate Rule 
6(e). The court acknowledged the Lance opinion and the fact that an individual may peti­
tion the government for contempt sanctions, although no such petition was filed in the 
instant case. Id. at 50 n.8. 
These cases, where the trial court did not dismiss the indictment or the appellate court 
did not uphold the dismissal of the indictment, imply that lesser sanctions are useful and 
adequate to uphold the public interest in a fair system, while at the same time protecting 
the public interest in law enforcement. 
214. 510 F. Supp. at 329. 
215. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), which stated: 
Errors of the kind alleged in these cases can be remedied adequately by 
means other than dismissal. For example, a knowing violation of Rule 6(e) may 
be punished as a contempt of court. . . . [T]he court may direct a prosecutor to 
show cause why he should not be disciplined and request the bar or the Depart­
ment of Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. The court may 
also chastise the prosecutor in a published opinion. Such remedies allow the 
court to focus on the culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the 
unprejUdiced defendant. 
Id. at 263. 
216. 842 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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Rule 6(e)(2) was not exclusive, because "may be punished" was per­
missive language. The court held that suppression of the testimony 
might be a more appropriate remedy than contempt. The court's ac­
knowledgment that "[slome Rule 6 violations are correctable"217 im­
plies that injunctive relief which prevents further damage is allowable 
under the rule. In this case, the damage had already been done to the 
defendant and he could not be protected, however, judicial action was 
necessary to "protect the integrity of the grand jury system."218 The 
court of appeals directed the district court on remand to determine 
whether particularized need,219 which would be dispositive on the is­
sue of suppression, justified disclosure of the grand jury testimony to 
another grand jury. The district court was also instructed to consider 
other remedies, including contempt, for the admitted violations of 
Rule 6(e).220 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit de­
nied relief in the form of terminating the grand jury proceeding in 
Scott v. United States.221 The appellant's allegations that the govern­
ment had made unauthorized disclosures that were the source of news 
stories about William J. Scott, the Attorney General of Illinois, were 
found insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Although the 
court was "satisfied that a denial of review at this time would deprive 
Scott of a meaningful opportunity to air his grievance before an appel­
late court,"222 the court found that denial of a hearing was proper 
because of the "weak basis"223 of Scott's allegations. The appellate 
court affirmed the district court's finding that the news media reports 
attributing their information to government sources were too vague to 
merit an evidentiary hearing. 
The lack of clarity in the Scott case about what was necessary for 
217. Id. at 740. 
218. Id. 
219. The Supreme Court has consistently construed Rule 6(e) as requiring particu­
larized need before permitting disclosure. See United States v. Sells Eng'g Inc., 463 U.S. 
418 (1983), where the Court restated: 
Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show ... that the 
need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy . . .. 
. . . [T]be need for it [must] outweigh the public interest in secrecy .... [T]he 
court's duty ... is to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the rele­
vant circumstances and the standards announced by this Court. 
Id. at 443 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979) 
(citations omitted». 
220. 842 F.2d at 740. 
221. 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978). 
222. Id. at 891. 
223. Id. at 893. 
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a prima facie finding for sanctions in a news leak case was addressed 
with specificity in Lance v. United States Department of Justice,224 
where the court held that a prima facie showing for sanctions did not 
require as strong a showing as one where the indictment will be dis­
missed. Additionally, the Lance opinion was the first to recognize a 
private right of action allowing a target to invoke the civil contempt 
power of the court for alleged violations of Rule 6(e). 
C.. Lance v. United States Department of Justice 22S 
In 1977, a federal grand jury began investigating banking prac­
tices in Georgia. Bert Lance, a close friend of President Carter and 
former Director of the Budget, was one of the individuals being inves­
tigated because of his involvement with the National Bank of Georgia. 
Nationwide attention was focused on the investigation through articles 
in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal. 
In Lance, the target's motion requesting sanctions against the 
government for alleged leaks to the press226 of a grand jury investiga­
tion was denied after two previous attempts at prohibition of all extra­
judicial pUblicity had been denied. Finally, Lance requested that the 
court order the attorneys for the government to show cause why they 
should not be sanctioned for unlawful disclosure of matters before the 
grand jury. Lance alleged that the news leaks, which were a violation 
of Rule 6(e), infringed his right to a fair and impartial trial. In re­
sponse to his motion, the district court found that Lance had failed to 
present sufficient evidence of governmental misconduct. 227 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir­
cuit concluded that the remedy requested by the target was. civil con­
tempt.228 The' court reasoned that the primary purpose of the 
proceeding was remedial, which was the controlling factor in charac­
terizing the contempt. The court emphasized that the harm alleged by 
Lance was repeatable, and, as such, waiting until the final judgment of 
a criminal trial would be an ineffective remedy. "Acquittal or convic­
tion would so obscure the claim of a personal remedy for grand jury 
224. 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 207-12 nn.I-3. 
227. Id. at 207-12. 
228. See Moskovitz, supra note 153, at 790 ("The prayer for relief ... has intrinsic 
significance in deciding the question of civil versus criminal contempt because it is a direct 
and conscious statement by the plaintiff of his purpose in bringing the action. "). 
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irregularity as to render it meaningless."229 Because the indictment 
had been returned against Lance, any remedial efforts at this point 
would not have interfered with the grand jury's deliberations. 
The Lance opinion analyzed what was required for a prima facie 
showing of a violation of Rule 6( e). First, there had to be a clear indi­
cation that the media reports disclosed "matters occurring before the 
grandjury."23o Second, the articles had to indiCate the source ofinfor­
mation as one proscribed by the rule.231 Third, the judge should as­
sume that all statements in the news were correct. 232 Fourth, the trial 
judge had to consider the nature of the relief requested and the extent 
to which it would interfere with the grand jury process.233 Finally, the 
trial court had to consider any evidence presented by the government 
to rebut the assumed truthfulness of the reports. 234 
Applying these factors in Lance, the majority concluded that 
"matters occurring before the grand jury" included disclosure of any­
thing· "tend[ing] to reveal what transpired before the grand jury. "235 
The court found that the articles contained "numerous disclosures of 
information about the grand jury proceedings, "236 and that the articles 
either expressly or inferentially identified government attorneys as the 
source of the information. The third factor, which required the judge 
to assume the truth of the articles, was considered plausible because 
secrecy prevented Lance from gaining access to testimony before the 
grand jury. The government was in the best position to know if the 
articles contained grand jury information and whether there was a vio­
lation of Rule 6(e). Because the indictment had been returned against 
Lance, the effect on the grand jury was a moot point. Finally, the 
court found the government's denial inadequate because the defend­
ants in the cases cited by the government's affidavit failed to ask for 
injunctive relief. 237 
The court held that Rule 6(e) expressly authorized the imposition 
of sanctions, and that granting the relief sought by Lance in this case 
would not have interfered with the grand jury's investigation. The 
. court did not discuss the possibility that criminal contempt was the 
229. 610 F.2d at 213. 
230. Id. at 216. 
231. Id. at 217. 
232. Id. at 219. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 219-2l. 
235. Id. at 216 (quoting United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 458 F. Supp. 784, 790 
(W.D. Mo. 1978». 
236. Id. at 220. 
237. Id. at 213-220. 
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exclusive remedy enVisioned by Congress in 1977. Additionally, the 
court did not discuss the related question of whether a target has 
standing to invoke the contempt powers of the court for alleged viola­
tions of grand jury secrecy. 238 The court merely concluded that Lance 
had such standing based on the remedial purposes of civil contempt. 
The dissent stated that the contempt in Rule 6(e)(2) is criminal 
and any denial of the motion for sanctions is not appealable, whereas 
the alleged contemnor can appeal without waiting for any final deci­
sion on the merits of the case in chief.239 The distinguishing charac­
teristics of criminal or civil contempt include the character of the 
offense and whether the purpose of the sanction vindicates the public 
interest (criminal contempt) or remedies a wrong to a particular per­
son (civil contempt). Additionally, it must be determined if the rem­
edy prayed for results in punitive sanctions, such as unconditional 
fines or imprisonment, or the remedy results in compensatory or coer­
cive, sanctions to secure performance of the obligation, making it a 
civil sanction. 240 
The Lance court provided useful guidelines to the lower courts 
when they are faced with the problem of the sufficiency of a prima 
facie showing of violations of grand jury secrecy in cases involving 
preindictment pUblicity. However, it did not analyze the relative 
weight to be given each of the findings nor set forth the procedures to 
be followed once a prima facie showing is established. Additionally, 
the Lance majority did not address the question of whether criminal 
contempt would have been more effective in punishing prosecutorial 
misconduct or deterring future violations.241 
238. Cf Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). InDouglas 
Oil, the Court held that the target of a grand jury investigation had standing to object to the 
release of grand jury transcripts. The target had an interest "legally protected under the 
Court's rulings concerning grand jury secrecy. One of the several interests ... is the pro­
tection of the innocent .... " Id. at 218 n.8. In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, 
581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978),the court denied a motion to quash grand jury subpoenas 
and to terminate grand jury proceedings. The appeIlant sought a writ of mandamus, aIleg­
ing grand jury abuse, which requires exceptional, compeIling circumstances and places a 
heavy burden on the petitioner. The court found such a drastic intervention unwarranted 
and found that the petitioner'S interests were protected by Rule 6(e). In United States v. 
Dunham Concrete Prods., 475 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir. 1973), the court stated that "apart 
from the question whether appeIlants have standing to remedy the aJleged breach of grand 
jury secrecy, the remedy in any case would not be to dismiss the indictment." 
239. 610 F.2d at 221 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). 
240. Id. at 221-22. See supra notes 130-80 for a discussion of the distinctions be­
tween civil and criminal contempt. 
241. But see United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985), where the defend­
ant was convicted of participating in the distribution and sale to grand jury targets of im­
printed carbon sheets used in the typing of secret grand jury testimony. The defendant was 
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In United States v. Eisenberg,242 the United States Court ofAp­
peals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order grant­
ing to the defendant the names of all the government employees 
"responsible for the egregious violations of Rule 6(e) that have already 
caused them great harm"243 after newspaper artiCles revealed details 
of the investigation. The court delineated the· procedures to be fol­
lowed once a prima facie case of breach of grand jury secrecy was 
established. The government's appeal did not challenge the district 
court's finding of a prima facie showing of governmental leaks of 
grand jury materials to the press. Rather, the government limited its 
challenge to the order requiring that it release all the names of govern­
ment employees responsible for the leaks. 
The district court had ordered the government to conduct an in­
house investigation to identify all the·government officials who had 
participated in the investigation. In balancing the targets' need to stop 
the leaks of prejudicial pUblicity with the public interest involv~ in 
protecting secrecy, 244 the appellate court found that the sanctions 
should be limited to the extent "necessary to stop the publicity and 
punish the offenders."24s The appellate court agreed with the district 
court's order to identify the responsible government officials, but de­
nied the relief requested by the grand jury targets that they should 
have access to this list. The court could· inspect such information, in 
camera, but the court, limited in its supervisory role of the grand jury, 
could not make the list available to those under investigation. 
The court of appeals acknowledged that inj1,lnctive relief was the 
best remedy for targets of grand jury investigations alleging leaks vio­
lative of Rule 6(e). "While the grand jury is in session, the only inter­
ests of the targets are to stop the prejudiCial pUblicity and to seek the 
convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982). The defendant argued 
that conviction under the statute was unwarranted because the exclusive language of Rule 
6(e) precludes application of any other statutory framework for his behavior and that he 
was not one of the persons covered by an obligation of secrecy under the rule. The court 
found that he was correct in asserting that he was not covered by grand jury secrecy under 
Rule 6(e), and that the language "no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person 
except in accordance with this Rule" precluded the court from expanding the persons cov­
ered. However, the court found the language imposing contempt on violators covered by 
the rule did not mandate that other individuals could destroy grand jury secrecy and escape 
criminal sanction. Id. at 675. 
242. 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983). 
243. Id. at 961. 
244. Id. at 964. 
245. Id. at 966. 
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punishment of individuals guilty of Rule 6(e) violations."246 The 
court did not address any distinctions between civil and criminal con­
tempt, but chose instead to focus on the limits of the supervisory 
power of the judiciary over the grand jury.247 While stating that the 
grand jury is neither a part of the judiciary nor the executive branches 
of the government, the court went on to "place no restrictions on the 
[district court's] power ... to order an investigation of the govern­
ment's alleged violations of Rule 6(e). We can conceive of circum­
stances where a district court could seek the appointment of a special 
counsel to assist the court in determining whether Rule 6(e) violations 
had occurred."248 Given such freedom to investigate, it is unclear 
where this court would draw its lines to respect the' separation of pow­
ers doctrine which limits the courts in its responsibilities for, and pow­
ers over, the grand jury. Perhaps the reluctance to interfere with the 
grand jury stemmed not only from the traditional independence of the 
grand jury, but also from respect for the Executive's increasingly pow­
erful role before the grand jury. 
Prior to Blalock v. United States,249 the federal courts addressed 
the need for contempt sanctions when other remedies were considered 
too drastic. Although there was a willingness to acknowledge the rem­
edy because it was expressly authorized and had traditionally been 
used to supervise the grand jury, there was an apparent lack of willing­
ness to impose it upon government attorneys. The remedy was consid­
ered less drastic than others that were potentially available to targets 
of grand jury investigations, although the possible effects on an attor­
ney cited for contempt could hardly be cOnsidered benign. There had 
been little analysis in the cases up to this point of what Congress in­
tended when it authorized contempt in the 1977 amendments to Rule 
6(e). The focus in some of the cases2SO and in law review articles2S1 
had been on.the parameters of the expanded language in Rule 6(e) of 
"attorneys for the government." Perhaps the lack of clarity at the 
congressional level on whether civil discovery could take advantage of 
broad grand jury investigatory powers, had obscured useful debate on 
246. Id. at 964. The court cited the Lance decision for authority on the role of the 
target's counsel in any hearings involving contempt sanctions. Id. at 965. 
247. Id. at 964-65. 
248. Id. at 966. 
249. 844 F.2d 1546 (l1th Cir. 1988). 
250. See, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983). 
251. See, e.g., Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 38; Walker, supra note 90; Note, 
supra note 77; Comment, Administrative Agency Lawyers' Presence in the Grand Jury 
Room: Rules to Prevent Abuse, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 159 (1979). 
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the less drastic remedies available to targets who 'allege abuse of the 
grand jury. 
V. THE BLALOCK AND BARRY DECISIONS 
Two recent federal courts of appeals decisions have examined the 
issue of whether the contempt provision in Rule 6(e) for violations of 
grand jury secrecy is a criminal and/or civil sanction. In Blalock v. 
United States,252 the majority opinion analyzed the target's motion 
under the Lance requirement for what is necessary for a prima facie 
showing of secrecy violations. However, the special concurrence re­
jected the reasoning in Lance and recognized criminal contempt as the 
sole contempt sanction for grand jury secrecy violations.253 In Barry 
v. United States,254 the majority accepted the reasoning in Lance and 
found that Rule 6(e) violations included civil contempt sanctions and 
equitable relief, whereas the dissent in Barry agreed with the restric­
tive interpretation of the Blalock special concurrence. 
A. Blalock v. United States 255 
In Blalock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling denying relief to the target of a 
grand jury investigation. The target had applied to the district court 
for an order permanently enjoining the grand jury from investigating 
charges of bid rigging and fraud in the construction of Georgia Power 
Company's nuclear power plant at Vogtle. The grand jury evidence 
had been gathered primarily by agents of the Federal Bureau of Inves­
tigation who collaborated with investigators from Georgia Power 
Company. 
The target alleged that the prosecutor had used the subpoena 
power of the grand jury to assist private investigations; that the prose­
cutor and the FBI had improperly remarked that they intended "to 
break [appellant] or run him out of business"; that the prosecutor had 
told a witness that the appellant might harm her; and that the prose­
cutor and the FBI made unauthorized disclosures of matters before 
the grand jury.256 This last allegation implicated Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 6(e). This allegation was supported by an affida­
vit from a potential witness who claimed to have been asked similar 
252. 844 F.2d 1546 (l1th Cir. 1988). 
253. ld. at 1553 (Tjoftat, J., Roettger, J., specially concurring). 
254. 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
255. 844 F.2d 1546 (l1th Cir. 1988). 
256. ld. at 1548. 
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questions by the power company investigators and the grand jury.2S7 
Appellant also claimed that the FBI questioned potential grand jury 
witnesses in the presence of investigators for the Georgia Power Com­
pany and consequently grand jury matters were disclosed to the power 
company investigators.2s8 Appellant also alleged that the prosecutor 
told a competitor that the grand jury would soon indict him, which 
was an unauthorized disclosure of matters occurring before the grand 
jury.2S9 
The district court denied injunctive relief, stating that it found, 
after reading the grand jury transcripts in camera, that the prosecutor 
and the FBI agents had behaved properly.260 The court also noted 
that the target had an adequate remedy at law, a motion for dismissal 
of the indictment if one were handed down.261 The court's remark 
that it doubted the truth of appellant's allegations, in light of the ex­
emplary behavior of. the government officials, prompted the appellant 
to move for the recusal of the court in the current controversy. The 
court denied the motion for recusal. 262 
On appeal, the district court opinion was affirmed. First, the 
court of appeals found that appellant had an adequate remedy at 
law263 through which to address any due process claims he might 
have. Second, the court focused on the binding precedent which per­
mitted a grand jury target to seek injunctive relief against the individu­
als covered by Rule 6(e)(2) and allowed the target to invoke the civil 
contempt power of the court to coerce compliance with an injunctive 
order.264 Following Lance, the court of appeals used the criteria sug­
gested there to determine if the appellant presented sufficient evidence 
to establish a prima facie case against the government officials.26s The 
appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that no such case 
had been established and affirmed the district court's conclusion that 
. the appellant's proof was inadequate or not credible . 
.1. The Special Concurrence 
The special concurrence addressed the issue of whether Federal 
257. Id. at 1548-49. 
258. Id. at 1550. 
259. [d. 
260. [d. at 1549. 
261. [d. at 1550. 
262. [d. at 1552. 
263. [d. at 1549. 
264. [d. at 1551. 
265. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of what is re­
quired for a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation. 
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides a- grand jury target a 
right -of action for injunctive relief to prevent grand jury leaks and 
whether the contempt in the rule was intended by Congress to be civil 
or criminal.266 The two judges asserted that Rule 6(e)(2) is nothing 
more than a statement by Congress that the law found in 18 U.S.C. 
section 401 (1982), subjecting persons to criminal contempt and 
thereby punishment for misconduct, applies to the wrongful disclosure 
by persons of "matters occurring before the grand jury."267 Criminal 
contempts in federal courts are handled as section 401 proceedings.268 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) provides for notice to the 
alleged contemnor and the procedure to be used in criminal contempt 
proceedings.269 The concurrence stated that under Rule 42(b) the per­
son bringing the alleged offensive behavior to the court's attention 
does not have the right to compel the court to action.270 
In reviewing the Lance decision, the special concurrence reiter­
ated the four requirements for a prima facie showing of a violation of 
Rule 6(e). In holding that this appellant failed to establish a prima 
facie case for official misconduct, the special concurrence stated that 
the Lance opinion failed to analyze the threshold question of whether 
a grand jury target has the right to seek injunctive relief against gov­
ernment officials.271 The special concurrence offered a four-step de­
ductive argument that must be made in order for tpe Lance holding to 
be valid: 
First, the premise is assumed Rule 6(e)(2) authorizes the district 
court to use its civil contempt power to obtain compliance with the 
Rule's secrecy requirements. Second, because civil contempt lies 
only to enforce an injunctive order, it follows that Congress gave 
the district courts the authority to enjoin persons subject to the 
Rule's secrecy requirements from the improper disclosure of grand 
jury matters. Third, since injunctions are adjudicative rather than 
administrative orders, they must be entered in article III "cases or 
controversies" between parties. Fourth, a proper party for bringing 
suit for injunctive relief is the target, because the target is the person 
whose interests Rule 6(e)(2)'s secrecy requirements were designed 
to protect. 272 
266. Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552, 1553, 1556-60 (Tjoflat, J.,Roettger, J., specially 
concurring). 
267. Id. at 1553. 
268. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. 
270. 844 F.2d at 1553 (Tjoflat, J., Roettger, J., specially concurring). 
271. Id. at 1554. 
272. Id. at 1555. 
298 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:245 
The special concurrence rejected that reasoning because it was 
based on the premise that the contempt in the rule was civil, whereas 
the court argued that the legislative history demonstrated that the con­
tempt envisioned by the Rule 6(e) is solely criminal. The court's inter­
pretation of the legislative history from the 1977 hearings was· that the 
rule as amended "codified a practice the district courts had been fol­
lowing for eighty years, "213 where common law breaches of grand jury 
secrecy had been prosecuted as criminal contempt of court.274 After 
the codification of grand jury secrecy in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure in 1946, courts continued the practice of prosecuting viola­
tions as criminal contempt. 275 The special concurrence stated that the 
words "knowing" and "punished" are further evidence of the intent to 
maintain only a criminal sanction. Further evidence was in the Senate 
Report which' stated that "the Rule ... provid[es] a clear prohibition, 
subject to the penalty ~fcontempt."276 
The special Concurrence emphasized the purpose of the two types 
of contempts as further evidence of the congressional intent. Criminal 
contempt is punitive, not remedial. The purpose of civil contempt is 
to force compliance with an injunction, not to punish past conduct.277 
The concurring judges used a hypothetical to suggest that civil con­
tempt in a Lance-type situation is futile because the prosecutor can 
only promise to stop leaking grand jury materials to end the imprison­
ment for the civil contempt which makes it particularly useless as a 
safeguard for ensuring grand jury secrecy.278 
273. Id. at 1556. 
274. /d. at 1557. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 1558 (citing SENATE 'REPORT, supra note 7, at 7, reprinted in 1977 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527,531). 
277. Id. at 1559. 
278. In Blalock, the specially concurring judges stated as a way of illustrating the 
uselessness of civil contempt: 
Posit a case in which the prosecutor leaks to the press grand jury infonnation 
concerning the target. Pursuant to the rule established in Lance, the target moves 
the court to order the prosecutor to show cause why he should not be held in civil 
contempt and sanctioned. The court issues the order, and at the show cause hear­
ing, the prosecutor admits responsibility for the disclosure. Suppose further that 
the court does not sanction the prosecutor, but rather warns the [sic] him that it 
will tolerate no further disclosure-as the district court did in Lance. The prose­
cutor, however, continues to leak additional grand jury matters to the press. On 
the target's application, the court holds another show cause hearing, finds that the 
prosecutor violated the Rule, and concludes that the issuance of a civil contempt 
sanction is now necessary to ensure future compliance with the Rule. Believing 
that a fine will not ensure compliance, the court chooses to incarcerate the prose­
cutor .... [T]he court advises the prosecutor that his incarceration will be tenni­
nated just as soon as he obeys the law.... [H]e can purge himself of the contempt 
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Additionally, the special concurrence suggested that because 
there is no civil contempt contemplated by Rule 6(e)(2), there is no 
right to injunctive relief, since that goes hand in hand with civil con­
tempt. Breaches of secrecy brought to the court's attention would be 
dealt with'under the court's supervisory power and the court would 
"take administrative steps to ensure the maintenance of secrecy."279 If 
the court was satisfied that a knowing violation had occurred, it could 
cite the violator for criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. section 401 in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 42(b). Failing that, the target could bring the disclosure to 
the attention of the United States Attorney who could proceed with an 
indictment under section 401. If the court or prosecutor refused to 
grant a motion for sanctions, the target would have no recourse be­
cause such decisions are not appealable. At that point, the target 
would be "simply a member of the public who has complained to the 
prosecutorial authority that a crime may have occurred."280 
The special concurrence, in positing a situation where the appel­
lant can establish that the government violated Rule 6(e), remained 
convinced that criminal contempt was the contempt remedy envi­
sioned by Congress and the only one that is functional in such circum­
stances. The specially concurring judges' opinion provided a good 
basis for a discussion of the sanctions that are useful and desirable to 
both the court and the target of an investigation. While the Barry 
court held that civil contempt, as contemplated in Lance, was an ap­
propriate remedy, the majority also recognized that the judges in Bla­
lock were merely following binding precedent. 
and obtain his release from custody by not making further disclosures of grand 
jury matters . 
. . . [He must] convince the court, albeit with a self-serving promise, that he 
will not disclose these matters in violation of the Rule .... 
The prosecutor promptly makes such a promise, but the court is not con­
vinced; consequently, he will remain in custody indefinitely, until the court 
changes its mind .... [T]he prosecutor's previous disregard of the Rule's prohibi­
tion renders his promise worthless in the eyes of the court. The court's decision 
therefore transformed the case from a proceeding for civil contempt into one for 
criminal contempt. The prosecutor is not being held in custody to coerce his 
future compliance with the Rule's secrecy requirement; rather, he is being pun­
ished for his past misdeeds. The law, however, precludes such a transformation; 
the court's only option, therefore, is to order the prosecutor's release upon his 
mere promise to obey the law. 
Id. at 1559-60 (footnote omitted). But see In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971) 
(The district court purged a grand jury witness of civil contempt of court upon his promise 
to testify upon the condition that he be given a transcript of his testimony.). 
279. 844 F.2d at 1561. 
280.. Id. 
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B. Barry v. United States 281 
In Barry, Mayor Marion Barry sought remedial relief and sanc­
tions against the government in a grand jury investigation examining 
official misconduct. His allegations included leaks from the grand jury 
to the press in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2). 
The allegations of leaks from the grand jury were supported by news­
paper and television reports and press releases from the United States 
Attorney. Barry claimed that these leaks were interfering with his 
ability to perform his official functions. 282 He sought an order for a 
show cause evidentiary hearing to determine if contempt ~anctions 
should be imposed, The district court found that the sanctions sought 
were civil and that Mayor Barry "failed to carry his burden to estab­
lish a prima facie case of prosecutorial misconduct based on violations 
of Rule 6(e)."283 The appellate court agreed that the cause of action 
was civil but reversed the district court, holding that Barry did have 
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case.284 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that the cause of action under Rule 6(e) could be civil and 
that "[e]very circuit that has considered the matter has recognized 
that a civil cause of action, either for equitable relief or civil contempt, 
is cognizable under Rule 6(e)(2)."285 The court found further that eq­
uitable relief in the form of ordering the government to stop the leaks 
was appropriate. ':[T]he Rule indicates no limits on the relief available 
to address violations. "286 
The court disagreed with the special concurrence in Blalock 
which would limit the scope of Rule 6(e) to criminal contempts.287 
Because Rule 6(e) does not explicitly provide for either civil or crimi­
nal contempt, the critical issue was the purpose of the proceeding. 
Since Mayor Barry was asking for prospective relief, an end to the 
grand jury leaks, the court stated that this necessarily required a civil 
remedy as opposed to the punitive sanction of criminal contempt. 
After characterizing the Blalock special concurrence as an "unu­
sual decision," the dissenting judge agreed that only criminal sanctions 
281. 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also In re Sealed Case, 865 F.2d 392 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). 
282. Id. at 1319. 
283. Id. at 1318. 
284. Id. at 1324. 
285. Id. at 1321. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 1324 n.6. 
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are allowed under Rule 6(e).288 The "official opinion" in that case 
belies the real analytic dispute. "Since we are not so bound, I would 
not inject into the decisional stream of this Circuit the virus already 
infecting the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits due to the Lance 
exposure."289 
The Blalock and Barry opinions analyzed whether the contempt 
provision in Rule 6(e) is criminal and/or civil. The distinction is im­
portant because of the consequences to the alleged contemnor in terms 
of due process and to the complaining party in terms of the type of 
relief that may be granted. Prior to the Lance decision, there was little 
useful analysis on the statutory limits of contempt under Rule 6(e). 
The following section will discuss the debate surrounding the nature of 
the contempt provision in Rule 6(e)(2) and attempt to explain the 
analysis that restricts or expands the remedies available to grand jury 
targets for breach of secrecy. 
VI. 	 CRIMINAL AND/OR CIVIL CONTEMPT IN FEDERAL RULE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e) 
The special concurrence in Blalock underscores the heuristic 
value of the debate surrounding the contempt provision in Rule 6(e), 
because current case law recognizes both criminal and civil contempt 
as possible remedies under the Rule. Both Lance and Barry interpret 
Rule 6(e) to permit civil, as well as criminal contempt, whereas the 
Blalock special concurrence found that criminal contempt is the exclu­
sive contempt remedy envisioned by Congress. The special concur­
rence in Blalock and the majority opinion in Barry will be the focus of 
this analysis. Given the limited remedies available to targets and the 
potential consequences to targets and contemnors, it is important to 
explore the possibilities and ramifications of both civil and criminal 
contempt in this context. 
In Blalock, the conclusion· of the special concurrence that the 
contempt provision in Rule 6(e) is solely criminal, was based on an 
interpretation of the text and legislative history of the 1977 amend­
ments. Additionally, the judges concluded that civil contempt was not 
useful to deter future prosecutorial misconduct. The Barry majority 
concluded that the text did not expressly limit the type of contempt 
and that the prospective and coercive nature of civil contempt in pre­
indictment publicity cases was particularly useful because it did not 
interfere with the grand jury. 
288. Id. at 1326 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
289. Id. at 1327. 
302 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:245 
An analysis-of whether the contempt provision in Rule 6(e) is 
criminal or civil includes the overarching consideration of the histori­
cal purposes of grand jury secrecy, as well as the legislative history of 
the 1977 amendments. The practical applications of civil and criminal 
contempts, including the statutory uses, will be considered along with 
the Supreme Court's decisions and interpretations of the tradition in 
American criminal procedure. This analysis concludes that the reme­
dies available to targets for violations of grand jury secrecy are limited 
and that absent specific restrictions by Congress in the rule itself or to 
the inherent supervisory power of the judiciary generally, "contempt" 
in the rule should be broadly interpreted to afford protection to the 
targets and to uphold the fair administration of justice. 
Section A of this analysis discusses the remedies available to 
targets who allege secrecy violations under Rule 6(e), concluding that 
contempt is the most appropriate remedy because of the specific au­
thorization in the rule and the judicial willingness to recognize it. Sec­
tion _B discusses the legislative history of the 1977 amendments, which 
is unclear as to the congressional intent behind the contempt provi­
sion. Section C discusses the inherent supervisory power of the courts 
over federal grand juries and concludes that the separation of powers 
doctrine precludes Congress, absent clearly restrictive language, from 
limiting a judicial decision to only one type of contempt if constitu­
tional and statutory requirements are met in the adjudication of the 
contempt. 
A. Remedies for Grand Jury Secrecy Violations 
Although contempt is expressly authorized in Rule 6(e), it is not 
viewed as the exclusive remedy for breaches of grand jury secrecy. 
Before deciding that contempt is the appropriate remedy, the court 
may want to assess "the stage of the proceedings and the cost, incon­
venience, and administrative difficulties created by alternative reme­
dies."290 Sanctioning the prosecutor may "aggravate an already 
hostile situation"291 from the defendant's perspective. The defendant 
wants relief that prevents or hampers the criminal investigation. The 
court's disciplinary measures taken against the prosecutor represent 
little effective relief from the defendant'S perspective. Even though a 
defendant may assert that society'S interest in fairness is ill-served 
290. THE GRAND JURY PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESEN­
TATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES }3·79 (3d ed. 1989); see also B. 
GERSHMANN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 6.4 (1989). 
291. THE GRAND JURY PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 
290, at 13-79. 
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when prosecutors violate the rights of defendants and long-established 
rules of practice and procedure, it is undoubtedly not the main goal of 
any request for relief. Courts need to balance the individual's needs 
for effective relief against society'S interest in prosecuting criminals 
and the fair administration of justice. 
As noted in the discussion of the cases,292 dismissal of the indict­
ment is viewed as an "extreme" remedy rarely granted to defendants. 
There has been no consistent standard for dismissal293 of an indict­
ment because the facts and circumstances, including the perceived 
level of prosecutorial misconduct, vary in each case. Even if the court 
dismisses the indictment, there is the possibility of reindictment if the 
dismissal was without prejudice.294 If the defendant can be reindicted, 
there remains the question of whether the prosecutor is effectively de­
terred from such conduct in the future. Given the almost certain pos­
sibility of reindictment, it is less certain that such a remedy is as 
"extreme" as the courts imply. However, the cost and administrative 
inefficiency of reindictment, and possibly even retrial, are great and 
will probably be considered ~hen entertaining a motion for dismissal. 
Grand jury secrecy violations that amount to preindictment publicity 
will almost never rise to the level of prejudice required for dismissal of 
an indictment. 
There is some question if violations of grand jury secrecy even 
rise to the level of "prosecutorial misconduct." In United States v. 
Dozier,29s the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
found that the prosecutor's unlawful disclosures to the press amounted 
merely to "prosecutorial indisct:etion at the grand jury level. "296 The 
defendant's concern that any defendant would be "understandably re­
hictant" to institute contempt proceedings against the government at­
292. See supra notes 181-289 and accompanying text. 
293. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (The court may 
not dismiss an indictment absent prejudice to the defendant.). 
294. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1980). Defendants 
were indicted for filling prescriptions with fictitious names. The defendants alleged viola­
tions of grand jury secrecy among other abuses before the grand jury. The court dismissed 
the indictment without prejudice because there was no showing that unlawful disclosures 
operated to prejudice their right to an unbiased grand jury or infringed upon their rights to 
a fair trial on the merits. The defendants had a right to an unbiased grand jury, but "no 
concomitant right to bar forever investigation into their alleged criminal conduct." Id. at 
172. 
295. 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). 
296. Id. at 545; see also United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 499 (D.c. Cir. 
1983) ("Since the concern over adverse pUblicity is its effect on the fairness of the ensuing 
trial, ... it was not error to fail to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the effect of pre­
indictment publicity on the grand jury."). 
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torneys who had not yet indicted him, was noted in a footnote as 
precisely the remedy sought in Lance.297 The court found the remedy 
of contempt adequate to deter prosecutorial misconduct because "[t]he 
touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor."298 
Similarly, motions to terminate grand jury proceedings are rarely 
successful. It is more likely that courts will exercise their supervisory 
power in a narrower way299 to enjoin a specific illegal practice, such as 
unlawful disclosure of grand jury matters. 3OO Most courts recognize 
that contempt of court is the appropriate remedy.301 In the Lance 
case, the court fashioned a remedy that combined an injunction to stop 
leaks to the press with an order that the prosecutor show cause why he 
should not be held in civil contempt. Many courts have recognized 
civil contempt under Rule 6(e),302 but the Blalock special concurrence 
was the first court to suggest that a more narrow reading of the rule 
was required. 303 
1. Contempt of Court in Lance, Blalock, and Barry 
The Barry and Lance cases are factually similar: both targets ex­
plicitly requested injunctive relief in the form of demands to stop the 
leaks to the news media from the government attorneys. Mayor 
Marion Barry and Bert Lance are both public figures whose activities 
were newsworthy. In contrast, only Blalock's activities were news­
worthy; Blalock was a private figure. In Blalock, the allegations in­
volved leaks to private investigators who potentially could proceed 
with a civil action against Blalock, whereas in Barry and Lance, the 
297. 672 F.2d at 545 n.lO. 
298. Id. at 545 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982». 
299. See United S~tes v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1134 (10th Cir. 1985) ("Ordinarily, 
the secrecy rule is enforced by the sanction specifically provided in the rul~punishment 
for contempt of court."). 
300. See supra notes 181-289 and accompanying text. 
301. See M. FRAN:KEL & G. NAFrALIS, supra note 2, at 133 ("[E]fforts to prevent or 
punish leaks from grand juries have been remarkably feeble. Probably the main practical 
obstacle to effective control has been the power and protected positions of those primarily 
involved with the delivery and dissemination of illicitly leaked information-the prosecu­
tors and the media. "). . 
302. Advance Publications v. United States, 805 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983); Hunter v. Civella, 673 F.2d 21t" (8th 
Cir. 1982); Lance v. United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980); Scott v. 
United States, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978,581 
F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978). 
303. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lance 
dissent. 
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concerns were reputational damage and possible future prejudice of 
the grand jury and/or a jury trial. Assuming the "correctness" of the 
holdings, Lance and Barry both established a prima facie case, 
whereas Blalock's evidence was insufficient. 
The facts and the holdings are not the important distinguishing 
characteristics of the cases for this analysis. The analytic dispute in 
these cases -centers on what relief is available to the target of a grand 
jury investigation when allegations of Rule 6(e) violations on the part 
of the government are presented to the court. In considering what 
relief is available to the target of a grand jury probe, the federal regula­
tions304 must be considered to determine the underlying procedural 
and theoretical rationale for the exercise of the contempt power. 
In the case of leaks of grand jury matters by government attor­
neys, contempt is expressly authorized by Congress, and it has the 
advantage of interfering only marginally with the grand jury investiga­
tion,30s a primary consideration. Given the limited remedies available 
to a target for alleged leaks of grand jury materials, contempt becomes 
more attractive as one of the few remedies regularly acknowledged by 
the courts. Although courts are reluctant to sanction prosecutors, this 
is the least drastic remedy and may prove useful to targets if courts 
would use it in ways that effectively serve the dual needs of protecting 
targets' rights by upholding the traditional respect for secrecy and so­
ciety'S need to have a fair and effective administration of the criminal 
laws. 
The Blalock special concurrence was critical of the analysis in the 
Lance opinion and pointedly offered a hypothetical306 to demonstrate 
the futility of civil sanctions in a Lance-type situation. The hypotheti­
cal did not factor in the historical importance of grand jury secrecy to 
the target. If the target is afforded some realistic concern, then the 
rights afforded the target should be more than mere admonitions to 
the prosecutor or delayed administrative efforts to control the leaks. 
The rights of the individual are no greater than the remedy. In the 
context of injunctions in "leak" cases, the remedy of injunction is 
worth no more than the contempt sanction which enforces the injunc­
tion. If, as posited, the injunction and subsequent coercive imprison­
304. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal 
statutes regulating contempt. 
305. But see M. FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2, at 23 ("An independent 
grand jury would be intolerable. The meaningful issues relate to the nature and character 
of the prosecutorial leadership, the presence or absence of safeguards and countervailing 
powers, and the nature of the authority formally invested in the grand jury."). 
306. See supra note 278 for the text of the hypothetical. 
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ment of the prosecutor are useless to effectuate the petitioner's prayer 
for relief, it is no more a "relief" to the petitioner if the prosecutor 
stays imprisoned for a determinate period of time to vindicate society's 
interest in justice. To eliminate the possibility of civil contempt be­
cause it may not be effective, is probably to cut off the target from any 
meaningful remedy. 
There remains the question of what standard attaches to a crimi­
nal contempt. If the behavior must be willful, then a determination of 
the prosecutor's intent307 is necessary. If there must be an obstruction 
of justice, it is questionable that leaks amounting to "prosecutorial in­
discretion" will ever rise to that level. To label the contempt solely 
criminal is to further discourage its use. Courts are generally reluctant 
to punish governmental abuses of grand jury secrecy and a require­
ment of criminal intent308 will make the task even more difficult for 
the target and for the. courts that want to correct abuse. 
The special concurrence in Blalock stated that the cases involving 
contempts for violations of grand jury secrecy proceeded under the 
theory of 18 U.S.C. section 401.309 Section 401 is based on the Judici­
ary Act of 1789, as implemented by the Act of March 2, 1831, enacted 
to limit and define contempt in the federal courts. This section ap­
pears to apply solely to criminal contempts because there is no men­
tion of civil contempt. However, 18 U.S.C. section 402 arguably 
contemplates civil contempt because of its provisions for fines paid to 
complainants. "[I]tis tacitly assumed that [section] 401 operates as a 
limitation of the power of federal courts with respect to civil contempt 
actions."310 If it is not assumed that sections 401 and 402 apply to 
civil contempt, the inevitable conclusion would be that courts have 
free rein under their inherent supervisory power with respect to civil 
contempt. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) distinguishes be­
tween civil and criminal contempt only in regard to notice to the con­
307. See Moskovitz, supra note 153, at 794, stating: 

On occasion courts have concluded that a contempt proceeding was criminal be­

cause the defendant's acts were wilful. In civil contempt the general rule is that 

the defendant need not have acted wilfully, and this would seem correct, inas­

much as civil liability for damage done ought not to depend on whether or not 

the defendant has a "guilty mind." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
308. Because some acts constitute both civil and criminal contempt, willfulness does 
not preclude civil contempt. [d.; see also United States v. Smith, 815 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 
1987) (Knowledge is the culpable mental state for violations of Rule 6(e)(2). Because the 
rule specifically supplies the culpable mental state, that is the element to be proved.). 
309. Blalock, 844 F.2d 1546,1557 n.14 (11th Cir. 1988). 
310. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 169. 
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temnor in a criminal contempt.311 
Additionally, the Blalock special concurrence pointed out that 
section 402 did not apply to improper disclosure of grand jury materi­
als because criminal contempt is not a crime.312 The 1946 enactment 
of Rule 6 codified the common law rule of secrecy breaches, which 
was "a crime at common law."313 If violations of Rule 6(e) are a 
crime, then section 402 would apply, opening up to the possibility that 
civil-type remedies are available to a target of a grand jury probe. Fur­
thermore, the federal courts view criminal' contempt as a crime,314 
since "it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable 
by fine or imprisonment."3IS Such a conclusion has procedural conse­
quences for the contemnor, but it also opens up the possibility that 
civil-type remedies are available to the person harmed by the improper 
disclosures. 
The problem is further complicated by the blurred distinctions in 
contempt proceedings and court orders.316 To illustrate the dual char­
acter of some contempt sanctions, the following hypothetical is useful: 
For example, if a court imposes a gag order to prevent jurors from 
being influenced by media reports of a trial, the order is apparently 
intended to benefit the parties by ensuring a fair trial. If one party 
violates the gag order, that party could be found in civil contempt 
for prejUdicing the rights ohhe other party, or in criminal contempt 
for flouting the authority of the court, or both. Enforcing compli­
ance through civil contempt proceedings would protect the rights of 
the other party and vindicate the court's authority at the same 
time.317 
The Blalock special concurrence's sole emphasis on the purpose 
of vindicating the court's authority, rather than providing a remedy to 
the complainant, fails to address the dual nature of some requested 
relief. The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the proceeding 
can be difficult to determine and should not be the controlling factor in 
characterizing the contempt. The contempt power allows a judge to 
fine or imprison a person who willfully violates court orders and to 
311. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 42. 
312. Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1558 n.17. 
313. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1946 enact­
ment of Rule 6(e). 
314, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
315. Id. at 201 ("Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense ...."). 
316. See supra notes 130-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc­
tions between criminal and civil contempt. 
317. Note, supra note 105, at 382-83. 
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award damages to someone injured by such behavior of the contem­
nor. Given the dual purpose and possible double remedy the judge 
may award in such a case, the contempt partakes of both criminal and 
civil contempt. In the present situation, the injunction is designed to 
restrain the prosecutor from leaking grand jury information to the 
press and to others not bound by secrecy in the rule. The prosecutor's 
imprisonment for a determinate sentence to vindicate the authority of 
the court does little to compensate the complainant, although it may 
deter further breaches. 
Although in the instant cases the targets did not-request mone­
tary damages, it is possible that an unindicted target of a grand jury 
investigation who was harmed by newspaper stories could seek con­
tempt sanctions against the government and request compensatory 
damages for loss of reputation.318 The court would then uphold its 
integrity with criminal sanctions against the contemnors and compen­
sate the complainant injured by the conduct. If the contempt proceed­
ing protected the due process requirements of the alleged contemnor, 
there is no analytic reason to avoid such remedies.319 However, the 
major problem when the judiciary desires both coercive and punitive 
sanctions is the constitutionally compelled safeguards required in a 
criminal proceeding. Judges have discretion in classifying contempt, 
but they should use this discretion for "the least possible power."320 
Ironically, it is secrecy which makes it difficult for the target to 
know precisely which of his rights may be threatened by the govern­
ment's behavior. "In contemporary experience, the effort to enforce 
secrecy is too frequently defeated by 'leaks.' And where a defendant 
wishes (after indictment, naturally) to see what went on before the 
318. Note, Private Prosecutors in Criminal Contempt Action.. Under Rule 42(b) a/the 
Federal Rules a/Criminal Procedure, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1986). Immunity 
may preclude damages paid to the target in situations where the prosecutor is the 
contemnor. 
319. See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904) ("It may not be 
always easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of these two classes. It 
may partake of the characteristics of both."). In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 
221 U.S. 418 (1911), the Court stated: 
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often 
serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. . . . 
It is true that either form of imprisonment has also an incidental effect. For 
if the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindica­
tion of the court's authority. On the other hand, if the proceeding is for criminal 
contempt . . . the complainant may also derive some incidental benefit from the 
fact that such punishment tends to prevent a repetition of the disobedience. 
Id. at 441-43. 
320. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). 
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grand jury, the claims for secrecy have tended to be pushed by prose­
cutors beyond the fair limits of their logiC."321 In grand jury investiga­
tions, the target must rely on the system's respect for rules and the 
integrity of the prosecutor because the work of the grand jury is 
shielded from the pUblic. The judge should be able to use criminal 
sanctions precisely because the effective and fair functioning of the sys­
tem is crucial to ensure actual fairness and the public's perception of 
fairness. The accused in trial has adequate safeguards: the right of 
confrontation and cross-examination; the right to testify and call wit­
nesses on his own behalf; the right to refuse to testify on grounds of 
self-incrimination; and the right to know the charges against him. 322 
All this is denied to the target of a grand jury investigation. Theoreti­
cally, the target is protected from any harm until after an indictment is 
returned. However, as the concerns over the 1977 amendments to 
Rule 6(e) demonstrate, secrecy is a double-edged sword easily worked 
to the government's advantage when the loosening of restrictions is 
met with an ineffective safeguard for the target. 
The conduct at issue in these cases constitutes indirect contempt 
because the violation occurs not in the presence of the judge or in the 
court, but under circumstances where only a few people know directly 
about the facts concerning the disclosures. The target may only later 
be affected by the public disclosures that allegedly prejudice the grand 
jury or the subsequent trial on the merits. Arguably, the government's 
conduct in each case is obstruction of justice and/or failure to observe 
the rules of the court. In so doing, the government affected the rights 
of the grand jury targets. Because indirect con tempts occur outside 
the judge's presence, they must be brought to the court's attention. 
321. M:FRANKEL & G. NAFTALlS, supra note 2, at 24; see also Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959), where Justice Brennan in dissent stated: 
Grand jury secrecy is, of course, not an end in itself. Grand jury secrecy is 
maintained to serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends 
or when the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing 
interest in disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted, for to do so in such a 
circumstance would further the fair administration of criminal justice. 
Id. at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the 
court stated: 
Thus, it is important to note that the common law concept of grand jury 
secrecy developed from a need to protect the jurors and the accused from the 
tyranny of the Crown . . .. 
. . . [I]t must be remembered that the policy of grand jury secrecy should be 
maintained to the full extent necessary to fulfill the ends ofjustice, and no further. 
Id. at 568-70 (citation omitted). 
322. Note, supra note I, at 599-600. 
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The target is the person most interested in seeing that such abuses are 
corrected. If the target is limited to the remote possibility that the 
prosecutor will be "punished" by the court, it is unlikely that the tar­
get will initiate any action. Without the vigilance of the targets or any 
realistic hope that anything can or will be done for secrecy breaches, 
the court will remain in the dark as to the prosecutorial practices 
before the grand jury. 
Unlike most courts, the judges in the principal cases decided in 
advance what kind of sanction would be imposed. All three of the 
cases arguably had aspects of both criminal and civil contempt. Lance 
wanted to stop leaks that would harm his reputation; Barry wanted to 
stop leaks that were interfering with his ability to perform official 
functions; and Blalock suggested that grand jury leaks would prejudice 
the outcomes at the grand jury. All three wanted to enjoin the prose­
cutor from illegal behavior. Factually, Blalock's case resembled more 
of the interest society has in guaranteeing a fair process, vindicating 
the court's authority. He asked for injunctive relief to stop the grand 
jury from investigating him, not coincidentally the relief that would 
most hamper future government investigations. Even if Blalock had 
brought the alleged misconduct to the court's attention and requested 
criminal sanctions against the contemnors, it is doubtful that he would 
have prevailed. At a minimum, the civil remedy for Rule 6(e) viola­
tions allows the target an opportunity to present evidence of the al­
leged leaks, whereas the criminal sanction is entirely dependent upon 
the court or prosecutor's willingness to proceed.323 The varied pur­
poses served by grand jury secrecy in any given circumstance should 
dictate the nature of the sanction. Grand jury secrecy historically pro­
tects the innocent and defies the intrusion of the government into in­
dependent inquiries by the "people's panel."324 Although the reality 
today is that the government guides the grand jury, the legislative his­
tory of Rule 6(e)(2) indicated a respect for the traditional safeguard of 
protecting the innocent from unfounded charges and public disclosure 
of matters under investigation. 
323. See United States v. Blalock, 844 F.2d 1546, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988). Although 
stating that the court can take administrative steps to ensure the maintenance of secrecy, 
the specially concurring judges did not specify wha~ those steps would be: In any case, 
those steps would have to involve some way of stopping· the leaks, an intervention that 
could conceivably involve an injunction, bringing the process full circle to civil contempt. 
If the district court declines to act, the target has no recourse on appeal. The problem with 
this thinking is that the target is the injured party, while the court is only an injured party 
in a secondary sense. 
324. R. YOUNGER, supra note 41. 




B. Legislative History of the 1977 Amendments . 
The legislative history ofthe 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) must 
be read in light of the dual policy rationale expressed by the Senate of 
assisting the government in effective law enforcement and allaying the 
fears of those who anticipated abuse of the system. It is also necessary 
to clarify exactly what abuse was contemplated by Congress when it 
considered the 1977 amendments. The contempt sanction was added 
specifically to curb abuse by the prosecutor.325 Although the con­
tempt sanction. had been used prior to 1977 to ensure grand jury se­
crecy, this language expressly authorized contempt and presumably 
was to encourage the vigilance of the jUdiciary against prosecutorial 
misconduct.326 
The early cases relied upon by the special concurrence in Blalock 
to support the proposition that Congress was merely codifying existing 
practice did not involve prosecutorial abuses. In In re Sum­
merhayes,327 the court charged a grand juror with criminal contempt. 
There was no dispute as to the purpose of the contempt, which was to 
uphold the proper administration of the laws. There was also an indi­
325. In the Blalock special concurrence, the judges cited the legislative history of the 
1977 amendments to Rule 6(e). 844 F.2d at 1556. The specially concurring judges omitted 
the phrase "such prosecutorial power" when discussing the specific language in the SEN­
ATE REPORT;supra note 7, referring to the fears expressed at the Hearings, supra note 94. 
326. But see Hearings, supra note 94, at 151-53, 157-58, where concerns were ex­
pressed about the potential abuse of grand jury secrecy by the expansion in the rule: 
Given that history-given that oath-l submit that intrusion on grand jury se­
crecy by the Government surely cannot be automatically permitted solely on the 
undocumented belief of a prosecutor that there must be disclosures to assist him 
in his duties. 
· .. [p]erhaps we would do better to put such boundless faith in our institu­
tions and principles rather than in the uniform reliability of Government person­
nel. That more conservative and traditional view has vivid history to recommend 
it. 
· .. [S]ecrecy has become a one-way street. 
· . . Who is going to try to hold the Government in contempt? 
Only one person and that is a convicted accused, who is probably the person 
that you are least interested in in some ways, and then it is after he has been 
convicted and he doesn't have too much of a shot at contempt. 
The idea that a contempt sanction serves any function is nonsense .... How 
do you prove bad faith after the fact? How? 
There is another thing with the contempt remedy that is wrong .... [T]he 
entire burden is put on the party charging that the breach was not justified. 
Id. (testimony of B. Nussbaum). . 
327. 70 F. 769 (N.D. Cal. 1895). See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of Summerhayes. 
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cation that the grand juror had possibly engaged in other criminal be­
havior. His revelations of grand jury matters were for the purpose of 
bribery and corruption. Given such a circumstance there is little rea­
son to expect the court to do anything but vindicate its authority and 
possibly proceed with other criminal charges.328 
In Schmidt v. United States,329 the breach of secrecy was by the 
attorneys for the accused, not by the government officials involved in 
the investigation. The contempt was considered criminal with no 
analysis of other remedies. However, the facts of Schmidt are distin­
guishable from the principal cases in this Note, because in Schmidt, 
the target was not asking the court for any relief, rather the court was 
interceding on its own behalf to vindicate its authority and protect the 
grand jury's secrecy. The remedy applied in Schmidt fit squarely with 
an analysis based. on the purpose of the proceeding to vindicate the 
court's authority rather than remedy a wrong to an individual. 
The other early case mentioned by the judges in Blalock was 
Goodman v. United States. 330 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit traced the punishment that had been meted out for 
violations of grand jury secrecy: 
So strict was ~he requirement of secrecy in this respect that an­
ciently a grand juror who disclosed to an indicted person the evi­
dence that had been given against him was held to be an accessory 
to the crime, if the crime was a felony, and a principal if the crime 
was treason; and later such conduct appears to have been de­
nounced as high misprision. Nowadays, in the absence of special 
statute providing a different method of punishment, a grand juror 
may be held in contempt for disclosing grand jury proceedings to an 
outsider.33 I 
These early cases are evolutionary and it is unrealistic to cite them in 
support of the proposition that Congress was merely enacting existing 
practices in 1977 when it approved the amendments to Rule6(e). 
On the other hand, if these cases do represent congressional re­
spect for past practices, they are a narrow comer of the reasons for 
using the contempt power to maintain judicial integrity at the grand 
jury level. It is unlikely that the final sentence of Rule 6(e) was a 
codification of all the remedies pertaining to the scope of power left to 
328. 70 F. at 773. 
329. 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940). See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Schmidt. 
330. 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939). See supra note 183 for a discussion of Goodman. 
331. 108 F.2d at 519 (citation and footnote omitted). 
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the discretion of the courts. One possible interpretation that comports 
with the Blalock special concurrenCe reasoning is that Congress did 
indeed intend criminal contempt because of the seriousness with 
which it viewed secrecy violations. However, given the separation of 
powers doctrine and the existing power of courts to uphold their dig­
nity and authority through inherent power, Congress indicated no ob­
jection to the judicial fashioning of a civil contempt remedy in 
combination with an injunction in preindictment pUblicity cases. 
When the federal rules were enacted in 1946, this type of breach was 
recognized as a serious problem. "Conspicuous pUblication in a news­
paper of large circulation that the conduct of certain persons is under 
investigation . • . is contempt of court. Offenders may be thereby 
warned that their conduct is under investigation. "3.32 
If Congress had intended to curtail or limit the judiciary's use of 
contempt while striking a balance between government agency access 
to grand jury materials and grand jury secrecy, the legislative history 
would presumably have been more clear. It is more reasonable to as­
sume that Congress left the courts free to fashion remedies, while en­
couraging the use of at least criminal contempt, and guiding the courts 
by the broad purposes of the rule. The Supreme Court, in United 
States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.,333 interpreted the 1977 legislative his­
tory precisely in the light of the historic reasons for preserving grand 
jury secrecy, while holding that the Department of Justice may not 
have automatic access to grand jury materials for civil litigation when 
the information was disclosed for reasons of technical assistance. 
Congress is also aware of the judiciary's inherent powers and 
there is no indication that it intended to curb the use of such powers in 
this context. Contempt is considered integral to the effective function­
ing of the courts. "[A]ny attempt to regulate it will be viewed as cut­
ting at the pulsebeat of the court, and will be examined with intense 
judicial scrutiny."334 In addition to an awareness of the importance of 
contempt, Congress also was aware of the common law importance of 
grand jury secrecy. The original Rule 6 embodied the "traditional no­
tion of secrecy," and one of the stated purposes was to protect the 
individual defendant from reputational harm which can be great in 
such proceedings. Congress intended to protect such people, albeit 
with a sometimes less than effective safeguard. 
332. Orfield, supra note 175, at 403.()4 (footnote omitted). 
333. 463 U.S. 418 (1983). 
334. Comment, supra note 113, at 1119. 
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The dangers and injustices which result from unauthorized dis­
closure of grand jury proceedings have been summarized as follows: 
1. The reputation of the innocent is ruined when such statements 
are made public and in fact no wrongdoing may exist or be charged 
or found. 
2. If erroneous, such stories are extremely difficult to rebut be­
cause the sources are not stated, and because erroneous assertions 
could only be contradicted by revealing the very investigative infor­
mation which is supposed to be secret. 
3. Defendants who are in fact charged may be depriVed of a fair 
trial because of the previous notoriety of the publicized version of 
the pre-indictment investigation. 
4. Trial of defendants who are in fact guilty is rendered difficult 
because of the problem of finding an impartial jury. 
5. Premature disclosure of investigations may jeopardize them by 
making witnesses more difficult to obtain or may lead to the de­
struction of evidence.335 
The potential harm for breaches of grand jury secrecy in this con­
text can be great. The courts' reluctance to impose criminal sanctions 
on government attorneys, coupled with the presumption of regularity 
of grand jury proceedings, can be insurmountable to a target who sus­
pects prosecutorial misconduct. One of the "catch 22" problems with 
motions that interfere with the grand jury is the fact that the defend­
ant's action may propel the investigation further into the limelight, 
somewhat defeating his claim that preindictment publicity is undesir­
able. If the courts continue to think criminal sanctions too harsh a 
penalty absent systemic abuse, then targets of grand jury investigations 
who suspect unlawful disclosures will be less inclined to move forward 
with any remedies that would benefit the system. Judges may not be 
aware of prosecutorial misconduct unless it is brought to their atten­
tion by those most affected by the abuse. 
C. Supervisory Powers and Independence of the Grand Jury 336 
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can regulate 
335. Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitu­
tional Rights ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1976) [herein­
after Senate Hearing]; Committee on Civil Rights; Committee on Criminal Courts, Law 
and Procedure; Committee on Federal Courts, Strengthening the Role ofthe Federal Grand 
Jury: Analysis and Recommendations, 29 REC. A. B. CITY N.Y. 464, 473 (1974). 
336. See generally United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1953) (The Court 
stated that the purposes of supervisory power are threefold: "to implement a remedy for 
violation of recognized rights; to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction 
rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury; and finally, as a remedy 
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the contempt power.337 The federal courts were created by acts of 
Congress and their power and duties depend upon the act of calling 
them into existence. However, the Supreme Court has also recognized 
that the "power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courtS."338 
"These powers of the courts are in general not subject to negation by 
the higher courts or by outside agencies,"339 with the exception of the 
regulatory statutes that limit but do not define the distinctions between 
criminal and civil contempt. 
The federal statute regulating contempt is 18 U.S.C.section 401. 
This statute regulates criminal contempt. There is no federal statute 
regulating civil contempt other than 28 U.S.C. section 1826 covering 
Recalcitrant Witnesses. This raises the question whether section 401 
also regulates civil contempts: 
[W]hile a virtual revolution in procedure has transformed the law of 
criminal contempt during the last decade, little has changed in the 
procedures for civil contempt .... [A]rguments for a unitary proce­
designed to deter illegal conduct." (citations omitted»; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 
332 (1943) (This case is generally regarded as the one which advanced supervisory power as 
an independent basis of decision.); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power o/the Federal 
Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1050 (1965) ("[S]upervisory power has become a catch-all 
doctrine . . . . The sole common denominator of its usage is a desire to maintain and 
develop standards of fair play in the federal courts more exacting than the minimum 
constitutional requirements of due process."). 
337. 	 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821), which stated: 
But if there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the prac­
tical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at 
liberty to exercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them. The inter­
ests and dignity of those who created them, require the exertion of the powers 
indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation. 
Id. at 226. But see Brautigam, supra note 115, at 1514-15, stating that "[o]ne can hardly 
deny that in creating a judiciary the constitutional framework contemplated that courts 
must be granted all powers essential to their operation. However, the claim that the con­
tempt power is one such essential power should be accepted only with reluctance." 
338. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). See generally Dowling, 
Inherent Power o/the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635, 636 (1935) (Inherent power is "essential 
to the existence, dignity and functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal and from the 
very fact that it is a court."); Kuhns, supra note 109, at 496, stating: 
These [powers] arguably include the power to define and determine penalties for 
affronts to its authority, both in the absence of any legislation proscribing contu­
macious conduct and also, perhaps, in situations in which existing legislation 
either does not proscribe certain conduct deemed contumacious by the judiciary 
or does not provide a penalty adequate to vindicate the court's authority. 
Id. But see id., supra note 109, at 497 (stating that "the Supreme Court has never struck 
down any congressional regulation of the contempt power."). The regulations in §§ 401­
402 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 do not infringe upon any interest the judi­
ciary may have in functioning as an independent branch of the government. Id. at 499-500. 
339. Orfield, supra note 175, at 441. 
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dure ... were resisted on the grounds that the traditional safeguards 
then available in criminal contempt were unnecessary in civil con­
tempt proce ed· 340mgs.... 
If such reasoning prevails, then the statutory limitations apply to 
civil and criminal contempts, and consequently, the procedures used 
will not be dispositive of the nature of the contempt. In such cases, 
the distinction once again turns on the relief granted or the purpose of 
the proceeding: vindication of the court's authority or coercion to en­
force the court's orders for the benefit of a petitioner. The regulatory 
statutes do not specify what type of misbehavior constitutes contempt. 
In this light, Rule 6(e) is unique because the conduct that brings about 
the contempt citation is clearly improper disclosure of grand jury 
materials. The question for the court becomes not what conduct elic­
its a contempt citation, which can often be the initial inquiry. Rather, 
the question becomes one of how to proceed, under what statutes, and 
whose rights are being protected or vindicated. If this is determined at 
the beginning of the adjudication, the regulatory scheme falls into 
place. 
In addition to contempt, the jUdiciary under its inherent power 
can dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct. 341 The 
Supreme Court has recently decided that courts should exercise their 
authority to dismiss indictments only when the alleged misconduct 
prejudiced the accused.342 The question in deciding the appropriate­
340. Fink, supra note 118, at 70. See supra notes 309-15 and accompanying text for 
the special concurrence's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. 
341. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979), where the court 
recognized: 
that dismissal of an indictment may impose important costs upon the prosecution 
and the public. At a minimum, the government will be required to present its 
evidence to a grand jury unaffected by bias or prejudice. But the costs of contin­
ued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are also substantial. This IS particularly 
so before the grand jury, where the prosecutor operates without the check of a 
judge or a trained legal adversary, and virtually immune from public scrutiny. 
The prosecutor's abuse of his special relationship to the grand jury poses an enor­
mous risk to defendants as well. For while in theory a trial provides the defend­
ant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the charges against him, in 
practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a devastating personal 
and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo. Where 
the potential for abuse is so great, and the consequences of a mistaken indictment 
so serious, the ethical responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of the 
judiciary to protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspond­
ingly heightened. 
Id. at 817; see also United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979). 
342. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988). "[T]he District 
Court had no authority to dismiss the indictment on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct 
absent a finding that petitioners were prejudiced by such misconduct. The prejudicial in­
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ness of other less drastic relief for the petitioner is whether anything 
short of dismissal deters future misconduct. Because federal courts 
have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with the grand jury, the 
final sentence of Rule 6(e)(2), added in 1977, which permits contempt 
of court sanctions against those who breach grand jury secrecy, has 
greater significance as an effort to encourage the courts to use their 
supervisory powers to correct or punish specific Misconduct. 
Although the grand jury has historically developed as an in­
dependent body, it is under the supervision of the courts. The court 
has power to enforce the investigative functions of the grand jury, be­
cause a grand jury may "so exceed its historic authority as to justify a 
court in interfering with its investigatorial power."343 This indepen­
dence was one of the reasons the grand jury has been accorded such 
wide latitude.344 However, the courts are reluctant to directly con­
front procedures and practices of prosecutors. This reluctance has di­
minished the importance of the grand jury as "a bulwark against 
despotism" since the prosecutor can now virtually control the grand 
jury. "Today, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor 
who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any 
quiry must focus on whether any violations had an effect on the grand jury's decision to 
indict." Id. at 263; see also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (The Supreme 
Court held that a guilty verdict at trial cured any defect relating to lack of probable cause 
at the grand jury level.). But see United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 
1986) ("Mechanik was carefully crafted along very narrow lines .... The Supreme Court 
in Mechanik did not hold that a Rule 6 violation of any sort ... which affects the funda­
mental fairness of the criminal proceedings discovered prior to trial is not justiciable after 
conviction."); United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Supervi­
sory power can be exercised to impose an 'ad hoc sanction' to enforce the appropriate 
performance of the government in presenting evidence to the grand jury." (citing United 
States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 778 (2d Cir. 1976), cen granted, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), cen 
dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978»). 
343. Cain v. United States, 239 F.2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1956); see also United States 
v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring) ("Our supervi­
sory power is not limited to control of conduct that occurs at trial; we have specifically 
found it to extend to matters involving the grand jury. "). 
344. See Application of Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Ill. 1939), where the court 
stated: 
A grand jury is a part of the court machinery, an all-important element in 
the agency of the government endowed with judicial power .... It has remained 
for the courts, tracing the history of the grand jury from the time of early Eng­
land, to determine for themselves when, upon a particular set of facts and circum­
stances, a question is presented, just how far a grand jury may properly go or 
should be allowed to go. 
Id. at 850-51; see also United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292 (N.D. Cal. 1952) 
("[TJhere can be no support for the position that the grand jury is an independent planet 
divorced from the court."). 
318 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:245 
time, for almost anything, before any grand jury."34S This transition 
from the grand jury as a method of protecting the rights of the individ­
uaP46 to acting as an arm ofthe state is striking in light of the histori­
cal development of the grand jury. This gradual usurpation of power 
has resulted in secrecy that now "shields" the actions of the 
prosecutor.347 
If the remedies are to be interpreted narrowly, the prosecutor is 
less likely to have an incentive to respect the target's rights in grand 
jury investigations. The doctrine of separation of powers may help 
explain the judicial reluctance. However, considering that some 
courts will go as far as dismissing indictments for egregious abuse of 
the system as a way of curtailing prosecutorial misconduct, it is unnec­
essarily confining to interpret Rule 6(e) as a restriction on judicial dis­
cretion. Another possible interpretation from the legislative history of 
the 1977 amendmenis is that Congress, given the concerns expressed 
at the hearings, wanted to encourage the judiciary to use contempt 
sanctions. . 
Perhaps the historical respect for the independence of the grand 
jury is outmoded considering the complicated nature of much modem 
litigation. Because the prosecutor guides the grand jury, he should be 
more readily sanctioned for abusing its process. The judiciary, under 
its inherent power, is in the best position to curtail or prevent such 
abuse.348 "The grand jury is under control by the court to the extent 
345. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 
(1973). 
346. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906) ("[T]he most valuable function of 
the grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between 
the prosecutor and the accused."). 
347. Senate Hearing, supra note 335, at 105, which stated: 
[T]he grand jury would be "a shield for the innocent and a sword against corrup­
tion in high places." How often down through the years have courts invoked 
these words or similar rhetoric to justify the grand jury's powerl But how seldom 
have these noble words borne any resemblance to the reality of the grand jury's 
actual role in our criminal justice system! 
... We have a situation where an American jurist can accurately assert that 
"(t)he prosecutor can violate or bum the Bill of Rights seven days out of seven 
and bring the fruits of unconstitutional activity to a grand jury. No court in the 
country has the power to look behind what the grand jury considers or why it acts 
as it does." 
Id. at 105-06 (quoting Baltimore Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. in Footlick, How to Get 
Your Man, NEWSWEEK, Dec. I, 1975, at 113). 
348. Note, supra note 336, at 1078, stating: 

The supervisory power is often exercised to prevent or correct injustice where 

existing procedures have proved inadequate .. " . [I]t is ... undesirable that an 

injustice go uncorrected simply because it is not susceptible to correction by tradi­

tional remedies. . . . [S]upervisory power serves the modem legal system in a 
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that it is organized by the court and the legality of its proceedings are 
determined by the court in accord with the statutes. Its members are 
subject to the supervision and control of the court for any violation of 
their duties .... It may discipline the attorneys, the attendants, or the 
grand jurors themselves for breach of secrecy."349 
CONCLUSION 
Civil contempt should be a remedy available to those adversely 
affected by leaks in grand jury investigations. A narrow interpretation 
which precludes civil contempt is not warranted by the legislative his­
tory of the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e). Additionally, because of 
the inherent supervisory powers of the judiciary, such a limitation is 
unnecessarily restrictive considering the grand jury's judicial function 
and the ex parte nature of the proceedings. Given the historic reasons 
for grand jury secrecy and the stated reasons in Supreme Court deci­
sions, it is unnecessary to give a narrow reading to a rule whose ex­
plicit purpose is to protect against further erosion by the government 
of the safeguards guaranteed to targets of grand jury investigations. 
The secret nature of the preindictment phase of a prosecution al­
lows the government great latitude in the conduct of an investigation 
that can irreparably prejUdice the defendant both at the grand jury 
phase and at trial. Encouraging the court to exercise its discretionary 
powers to fashion effective remedies which do not interfere with the 
work of the grand jury will protect the defendant, respect the inherent 
power of the court, and uphold the fair and effective administration of 
justice. 
Janice S. Peterson 
manner closely resembling the role played by early equity, and represents the 
finest feature of modem supervisory power. 
Id. 
349. Orfield, supra note 175, at 440-41 (footnote omitted). 

